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ABSTRACT 
Governments strive to improve the efficiency of service delivery with the intention of 
achieving societal goals. Thus, in order to ensure the quality of public services and goods 
provided to the people, central governments need to follow a decentralised governance 
approach. The decentralisation theorem states that, if the consumption of public goods 
and services over different geographical regions of the total population and the cost of 
providing these public goods and services in each region are the same for both the central 
and the sub-national government, the provision of public goods and services will be more 
efficient if they are provided by the sub-national government to their respective 
jurisdictions.  
This dissertation’s main aim is to investigate the extent to which the Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government (ECPG) is efficient in the provision of social services to the 
people under their jurisdiction. The efficiency scores obtained using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis Computer Program (DEAP) 2.1 version proved that the ECPG, 
education, health, social welfare and the housing departments are inefficient in the 
provision of social services. In this case, fiscal decentralisation as an appropriate vehicle 
for service delivery seems not to be working for the Eastern Cape Province, unless there 
is an improvement in the efficiency levels at which the social services are provided by 
these departments.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
South Africa is a unitary state with three levels of government, Central, Provincial and 
the Local government. Of these three, the Provincial Government is a sphere of 
government that is believed to be closer to the people. Thus it has a critical role to play in 
restoring the spatial, social and economic environments which were fundamentally 
damaged by the apartheid system in South Africa. According to the Franciscan Youth 
International (2004), the majority of citizens in the world, mostly of developing 
countries, do not have access to basic human necessities such as adequate food, clean 
water, health services and education. As a result, the duty of the Provincial Government 
is to ensure that the majority of the citizens in their jurisdictions have access to these 
services. The concept of decentralization holds that the closer the government is to the 
people the more efficient the government would be in service provision. 
 
In Southern Africa, the total population is estimated at seventy eight million people of 
which thirty-nine percent (thirty million) are said to be undernourished (Franciscan 
Youth International, 2004), and South Africa is not an exception. The South African 
economy is characterized by high levels of unemployment, underdevelopment, poverty, 
low average household income, poor availability of social infrastructure, huge service 
delivery backlogs and increasing incidences of HIV and AIDS (Statssa, 2007). This 
means that Provincial Governments in South Africa are faced with increasing demands as 
well as higher expectations from the community for an efficient1 provision of social 
services.  
One of the question being asked today is, are provincial governments an asset or a 
hindrance to social service delivery (Kihato and Rapoo, 2001). The above question has 
led the society at large to rethink on the current role of the provincial government in the 
wake of the far-reaching transformation of local government. The Provincial 
Governments in South Africa leave a lot to be desired. The article entitled “drain without 
                                                 
1
 Efficiency refers to the ratio of output to input. 
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gain” supports this argument. This article states that, “the nine provinces in South Africa, 
namely, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Western Cape, KwaZulu Natal, Gauteng, 
Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Free State and the North West Province, represent a huge drain 
without gain” (“Drain without gain”, 2006). This means that they do not use the funds 
allocated to them efficiently. 
Understanding the levels of efficiency and their implications on the use of revenue, is one 
way that could enable the provincial government planners to determine ways of 
allocating resources to the departments responsible for the provision of social services. 
This is because allocating more resources to this sector without addressing issues of 
efficiency will only result in insufficient use of resources. Much attention, therefore, 
should be devoted to identifying attributes of the social service sector that are associated 
with inefficiency. This is so because efficiency is a way of generating more resources 
without necessarily looking for additional investment. The fact that resources are 
insufficiently used means that an improvement in efficiency is similar to an increase in 
resources that can be used in the system. Although resources in the public sector are 
always scarce, inefficient use of these resources severely restrict the ability of education, 
health, social welfare and the housing service providers and policy makers to extend 
social services of acceptable quality to the vast majority of the people. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The theory of fiscal decentralization states that services that are closely associated with 
poverty reduction can be provided more efficiently if they are provided by the sub-
national government. The reason behind this ideology is that, decentralized provision of 
public goods and services leads to enhanced economic efficiency (Oates, 1999). 
However, According to Kihato and Rapoo (2001), the public dialogue is no longer 
dominated by political questions such as federalism or provincial autonomy; they have 
been eclipsed by social issues. And when questions such as the structure of the state are 
raised they are often linked to enhancing the capacity and improving the efficiency of 
service delivery (Kihato and Rapoo, 2001). Hence the need to measure the extent to 
which the provincial governments are efficient in the provision of social services. 
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For Oates (1999), the link between resource availability and service delivery outcomes is 
not uniform across regions and sub-national governments. There is a strong perception 
amongst the people of South Africa that there is room for improvement in the delivery of 
social services in the country (Statssa, 2007). The Eastern Cape is identified as one of the 
poorest provinces in South Africa (National Treasury, 2003). Thus, with the limited 
resources that the Eastern Cape Province (ECP) has at its disposal as compared to other 
provinces, there is critical need for their efficient use.  For reasons well publicized in the 
public domain such as the qualified audit reports, persisting allegations of dubious tender 
allocations, public demonstrations of dissatisfaction with service delivery, only to 
mention a few, there is need for the Provincial Government to improve in service 
provision. This relates specifically to its mandate for ensuring efficient resource 
utilization. 
 
With the introduction of fiscal decentralization, the provincial governments were given 
the responsibility of making sure that there is good financial management as well as 
efficiency in the service delivery, especially in the provision of social services through 
the use of limited resources that they have at their disposal (National Treasury, 2006).  
 
The fact that these Provincial Governments are delegated the responsibility to ensure that 
citizens are well provided for, means that there should be a strong and an unshakable 
commitment to the governmental role of enabling the society to function efficiently and 
harmoniously and to ensure that the most basic needs of human life are satisfied. Hence, 
among others, the public sector, in this case the Provincial Governments are expected to 
render social services in an efficient and economical way in order to ensure that the needs 
of people are met (Franciscan Youth International, 2004). 
 
In light of these arguments and the scarcity of resources available to the sub-national 
governments, there is a great need to figure out how to allocate the available resources 
proficiently in order to maximize efficiency. The major problem related to the public 
sector has been ineptitude in the utilization of the existing resources rather than 
availability of these resources. As a result, this calls for a thorough investigation into the 
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operations of those departments that are responsible for the provision of social services 
that utilizes a significant proportion of the provincial budget. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
According to the general public finance theory, fiscal decentralization contributes 
towards the efficiency of governments in the provision of public services and goods. Due 
to decentralization the Provincial Government strives to improve efficiency in the 
provision of social services in order to meet societal goals. This is so because 
decentralization creates incentives for citizens to go and vote and to a larger extent; this 
means that consumer preferences will be satisfied.  
 
Therefore the objectives of this study are as follows:  
a) To investigate the extent to which the ECPG is efficient in the provision of social 
services in comparison with the other provinces.  
b)  To determine whether inefficiency in the provision of social services is due to the 
provinces over-spending or under-spending of the budget or due to other factors 
not related to budget expenditure.  
c) The measuring of efficiency will help in the identification of deficiencies in 
service provision, and this is necessary because it demonstrates how the efficiency 
of service delivery might be improved.  
d) The outcomes of this research will determine the ways in which these provinces 
can improve on their revenue expenditure and in the process help these provinces 
attain maximum efficiency levels through an improvement in social service 
delivery.  
 
The above objectives will be attained through employing the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) model. The DEA software, DEAP version 2.1 developed by Coelli in 1996 will be 
used. Moreover, the outcome of this research project will give an indication as to whether 
a fiscally decentralized system is an appropriate vehicle for service delivery in the 
Eastern Cape as well as in the other provinces.   
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The application of economics in the study of social service provision by the government 
is a relatively new approach of academic study. For this reason not many studies have 
been undertaken to investigate the application of economics in the provision of education, 
health, social welfare and housing services at a provincial level. Therefore this research 
seeks to provide contribution to the field of economics in the public sector of South 
Africa. The social service sector has been selected because of its influence on the 
reduction of poverty in South Africa and its importance within the Millennium 
Development Goals framework. This is more critical to the people who were formally 
marginalized during the apartheid era. This follows from the recognition that an 
improvement in the lives of South Africans will have a significant contribution to 
economic development.  
 
The purpose of this research is to determine the efficiency of departments that are 
responsible for the provision of social services. There is a general view that inefficiency 
in the public sector is more prevalent among departments that provide social services. 
This view is inconsistent with the fiscal decentralization theory’s tenet which argues that 
a centralized system is inefficient by nature in the provision of social services and that 
fiscal decentralization is the only way to improve efficiency. It is against this background 
that this study seeks to investigate the levels of efficiency with which education, health, 
social welfare and the housing departments are operating in South Africa. The results of 
this study will help inform policy makers with regard to matters of social service 
delivery. 
1.5 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Like any other empirical technique, the DEA model has a number of simplifying 
assumptions that need to be acknowledged. Being a deterministic rather than statistical 
technique, DEA produces results that are particularly sensitive to measurement error. If 
one organization’s inputs are understated or its outputs overstated, then that organization 
can become an outlier that significantly distorts the shape of the frontier and reduces the 
efficiency scores of the other departments that provide similar services. In regression-
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based studies, the presence of error terms in the estimation tends to discount the impact of 
outliers, but in DEA they are given equal weight to that of all other departments.  
 
Moreover, DEA scores are sensitive to input and output specification and the size of the 
sample. Increasing the sample size will tend to reduce the average efficiency score, 
because including more organizations provides greater scope for DEA to find similar 
comparison partners. Conversely, including too few organizations relative to the number 
of outputs and inputs can artificially inflate the efficiency scores. Despite these 
limitations, DEA is a useful tool for examining the efficiency of government service 
providers. Just as these limitations must be recognized, so must the potential benefits of 
using DEA (in conjunction with other measures) be explored to increase our 
understanding of public sector performance and potential ways of improving its 
efficiency (Commonwealth Steering Committee, 2006). 
 
Measuring efficiency in this context will be a difficult task because the services that are 
provided by the public sector are either for free at the point of use or at a price that is not 
determined by market forces as in the private sector. This makes it very difficult to define 
the aggregate output of a public service such as schools, hospitals or social welfare 
services. This will be solved by looking at the health sector or the education sector as a 
whole without referring to subsections of the whole sector. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation is broken-down into six chapters. The study proceeds with the second 
chapter describing background information on South Africa during and post the apartheid 
era. The third chapter provides detailed theoretical and empirical literature review on the 
application of DEA efficiency of the departments responsible for the provision of social 
services. The fourth chapter presents a description of data and the methodology used to 
measure the efficiency of the education, health, social welfare and the housing 
departments and the justification for using that procedure. Chapter five interprets the 
results obtained. Lastly chapter six provides a conclusion to this dissertation listing the 
key findings and suggestions for further research. 
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1.7  CONCLUSION 
 
The theory of fiscal decentralization proposes that the Provincial Government as a sphere 
that is closer to the people has a critical role to play in improving the lives of many South 
Africans. Therefore, the provision of public goods and services by the sub-national 
government is supposed to lead to an enhanced economic efficiency. In a nutshell, the 
outcome of this research project will give an indication as to whether a fiscally 
decentralized system contributes towards an improvement in efficiency levels at which 
the South African Provincial Governments provide social services to the people of South 
Africa.   
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2 CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The year 1994 marked an end to an era where political power was concentrated in the 
hands of a few, to a government that had a vision of a better live of every South African. 
The new government undertook bold measures aimed at erasing the legacy of apartheid, 
that is, poverty, inequality, racism, unemployment and economic stagnation. To do this, 
they were supposed to have an idea of the population of South Africa; hence, the 1996 
census was the first to reach out to all South Africans in every part of the country. Since 
1996, there has been an increase in the South African population at both national and 
provincial levels. The Eastern Cape Province has the third largest population and at the 
same time it has the largest number of people who are living in poverty. This has been 
attributed to the fact that Eastern Cape has a high percentage of people living in non 
urban areas. During the apartheid era, the poverty levels of the majority worsened even 
though the South African government was decentralized. It had four provinces and ten 
homelands. With the end of the apartheid era, the new South African government was 
transformed into nine provinces. As soon as these provinces were established in 1994, 
they were mandated to perform their duties in the provision of public goods and services 
efficiently. 
 
The developmental challenges for the new state in South Africa have historically been 
produced by a series of experiences, one of them being apartheid. According to Wolpe in 
Unterhalter et al (1992, p. 3), stated that this historical event affected the pace at which 
the new government provides public goods and services to South Africans. Through 
decentralization, the new South African government hoped to resolve many of the social 
issues that were neglected during the apartheid era. These issues are education, housing 
shortages, health, unemployment and crime. Aiming to reform the country and to make 
decentralization more efficient, in 1997, the former President, Nelson Mandela, gave the 
provincial governments more than half of Central Government’s funding and he 
permitted them to develop and manage their own budgets. 
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2.2 POPULATION AND POVERTY LEVELS 
 
A census provides a wealth of information which impacts significantly on the planning of 
a better life for the citizens of their country (Statssa, 2007). The black2 population was 
not accurately accounted for, because many black South Africans lived in informal 
settlements, or “squatter camps”. These were close to cities where they worked or hoped 
to find employment. In the 1970s and early 1980s the black South Africans who lived in 
homelands or Bantustans and those who were assigned to live there were also excluded 
from the official census as the homelands were granted nominal independence (South 
African Government Information, 2007). With the end of the apartheid era, all ten 
homelands were reincorporated into South Africa.  
 
The Statistics Council, which is an independent statutory body, recommended to the 
Minister of Finance that the results of the 1996 census be officially adopted (Statssa, 
2007). This was because, for the first time in a quarter of a century the census had 
reached out to South Africans in every part of the country (Statssa, 2007). The table 
below shows population by province for the census years 1996, 2001 and 2006: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The term “black” is used in this case to refer to members of the African, Indian and Colored communities. 
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Table 2-1: The South African population: 1996, 2001 and 2006 
PROVINCE 1996 (Million) 2001 (Million) 2006 (Million) 
Eastern Cape 6 302 525 6 436 763 6 894 300 
Free State 2 633 504 2 706 775 2 958 800 
Gauteng 7 348 423  8 837 178 9 526 200 
KwaZulu Natal 8 417 021 9 426 017 9 924 000 
Limpopo 4 929 368 5 273 642 5 365 400 
Mpumalanga 2 800 711 3 122 990 3 508 000 
Northern Cape 840 321 822 727 1 094 500 
North West 3 354 825 3 669 349 3 374 200 
Western Cape 3 956 875 4 524 335 4 745 300 
South Africa 40 583 573 44 819 778 47 390 000 
 (Statssa, 2007) 
 
This population increase can also be shown through the percentage that each province 
contributes towards the nation’s population. This is shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2-2: Population Percentages: 1996, 2001 and 2006. 
PROVINCE 1996 (%) 2001 (%) 2006 (%) 
Eastern Cape 15.5 14.4 14.6 
Free State 6.5 6 6.2 
Gauteng 18.1 19.7 20.1 
KwaZulu Natal 20.7 21 20.9 
Limpopo 12.1 11.8 11.3 
Mpumalanga 6.9 7 7.4 
Northern Cape 2.9 1.8 2.3 
North West 8.3 8.2 7.1 
Western Cape 9.7 10.1 10 
South Africa 100 100 100 
 (Statssa, 2007) 
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From Table 2.1 and 2.2 above, it is clear that there was an increase in the South African 
overall population from 1996 to 2001. From the two tables, the Eastern Cape Province 
has the third largest population after Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal province respectively. 
In South Africa as a whole sixty three percent of the total population lives in the rural 
areas, as compared to thirty seven percent who live in urban areas (Statssa, 2007).  
 
This high proportion of non-urbanites in the Eastern Cape Province has contributed to the 
continued high levels of poverty. This is despite the introduction of fiscal decentralization 
of which the main objective was to reduce poverty. The Eastern Cape is the second 
largest poorest province in South Africa and this is shown by the table below: 
 
Table 2-3: Poverty Indicators by province 
Province No. of poor persons (million) % of population in poverty 
Eastern Cape 4.6 72% 
Free State 1.8 68% 
Gauteng 3.7 42% 
KwaZulu-Natal 5.7 61% 
Limpopo 4.1 77% 
Mpumalanga 1.8 57% 
North West 1.9 52% 
Northern Cape 0.5 61% 
Western Cape 1.4 32% 
South Africa 25.7 57% 
 (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2007) 
 
According to the Eastern Cape Provincial Treasury (2006) the key features of poverty 
and unemployment are: 
a) Relatively high rural population (sixty seven percent of the population) 
b) Relatively low proportion of employed people and 
c) Relatively high proportion of poorly paid employees 
The features named above can be further supported by socio-indicators of the nine 
provinces in the table below: 
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Table 2-4: Socio-Economic Indicators 
Province 
Area 
(Sq.Km.) Population  
Urban  
Population 
Employment  
Rates 
Share of  
total SA GDP 
Eastern Cape 168 966 6 894 300 2 523 314 48.5 8.1 
Free State 129 825 2 958 800 2 029 737 30.0 5.5 
Gauteng 16 548 9 526 200 9 240 414 28.2 33.3 
KwaZulu-Natal 94 361 9 924 000 4 277 244 39.1 16.7 
Limpopo 125 755 5 365 400 2 097 871 32.9 6.7 
Mpumalanga 76 495 3 508 000 2 459 108 28.5 6.8 
Northern Cape 372 889 1 094 500 120 395 46.0 2.4 
North West 106 512 3 374 200 1 177 596 37.9 6.3 
Western Cape 129 462 4 745 500 4 218 750 17.9 14.5 
South Africa 1 219 000 47 390 900 25 448 913 33.9   
 (South African Government Information, 2007) 
2.3 GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.3.1 PRE INDEPENDENCE ERA 
 
In 1934 South Africa was established as an independent state within the British 
Commonwealth and in 1961 it declared itself as a Republic with four provinces. These 
were the Cape Province, Natal Province, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
Provinces (South African Government Information, 2007).  Looking at how vast South 
Africa is, with an estimated area of 1 219 090 km2, it is evident that these four provincial 
governments were not in a position to provide services to each and every citizen of South 
Africa in an efficient way.  
 
The fact that there were four provincial governments means that there was an element of 
decentralization in the South African Government during the apartheid era. The Central 
Government seems to have been reluctant to fully empower these provincial governments 
with the resources needed so that they could provide services to the people under their 
jurisdiction. In July 1987, the Central Government granted provincial governments the 
power to administer government regulations and to coordinate the provision of services to 
the people in their jurisdiction for the first time (South African Government Information, 
2007). 
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This move by the Central government was a way of encouraging the provincial 
governments to be efficient in the provision of services to the people. Nonetheless, this 
created more problems as the provincial governments were discriminating racially. The 
reason why there was this discrimination by these provincial governments is because they 
were elected by whites only. This discrimination contributed towards the development of 
those who lived in urban areas, meaning whites and this was a disadvantage to those who 
lived in the homelands, that is, black South Africans (South African Government 
Information, 2007). 
 
In the 1990s, the homelands accounted for approximately forty four percent of the 
country’s total population. These ten homelands constituted fourteen percent, that is, 170 
673 km2 of the total land area of South Africa which is estimated at 1 219 090 km2. In 
1992, a study was carried out by the Urban Foundation, a South African research 
organization. It concluded that this high population density, several hundred persons per 
kilometer in these homelands, greatly contributed towards the socio-economic and 
political problems in the homelands (Statssa, 2005). 
 
From the above discussion, one can surmise that, for almost forty years, from the 1950s’ 
till the early 1990s’, South Africa was being governed by a system of apartheid that 
denied non whites many of the basic rights, for example, the right to quality education, 
health, housing and social welfare. 
2.3.2 POST INDEPENDENCE ERA 
 
In 1994, the new government redrew the country’s internal boundaries. It dissolved the 
homeland boundaries and formed nine new provinces. This was an attempt to resolve the 
problems which had been caused by the high population density. The new provinces were 
identified as the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga, 
Northern Province, Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and the North-West Province (Byrnes, 
1996). According to Craythorne (2003, p. 141), the constitution specifically stipulated 
that of the three levels of government, the sub-national government, meaning the 
provincial and the local government, was to promote social and economic development. 
14 
 
The new government, in order to replace the existing all white city councils with non-
racial, democratically chosen municipal governments and to establish multiracial local 
councils in rural districts, established new local governments below the provincial levels. 
These local governments were selected through elections which were first held in 1995. 
This was done because the Local Government transition Act (No 209) of 1993 required 
forty percent of local government members to be elected by a system of proportional 
representation using a party list system and sixty percent to represent individual 
localities. These elections for local government replaced the bureaucratic infrastructure 
that had existed since the apartheid era (South African Government Information, 2007).  
 
With the establishment of the local governments, South Africa became a constitutional 
democracy with a three-tier system of government, that is the national, provincial and the 
local government. These three levels of government all have legislative and executive 
authority in their spheres. They are recognized by the South African constitution as, 
“distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” (South African Government Information, 
2007).  
 
Through decentralization, the new South African government wanted to make sure that 
there was an improvement in the delivery of essential services to the majority of the 
people. When the provincial governments were established in 1994, that is, soon after 
independence, they were not able to perform their duties efficiently. The reason was that 
the provincial government authority was not yet clearly defined. Not only this, but many 
provincial and local level offices and procedures continued to be under the control of 
apartheid era civil servants (South African Government Information, 2007). In 1995, 
several provincial administrators demanded more autonomy and more financial support 
from the central government and this was resolved in the same year by holding elections. 
The 1995 local government election’s main objective was to replace the existing all white 
city councils with non-racial municipal governments (South African Government, 
Information 2007). 
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The new democratic government’s main aim in implementing decentralization was to 
resolve many of the social issues that were neglected during the apartheid era. With the 
aim of reforming the country and to make decentralization more efficient, the provincial 
governments were permitted to develop and manage their own budgets (South African 
Government Information, 2007). President Thabo Mbeki, in his 2004 State of the Nation 
address, promised to reduce poverty, stimulate growth and fight crime. This means that 
after ten years South Africa was still trying to resolve the problems that were created by 
the apartheid regime. This alone suggests that the transformation of the South African 
society to remove the legacy of apartheid will be a long term process requiring the 
sustained commitment of the leaders.  
2.4 EDUCATION 
 
During the Apartheid era, the education system in South Africa was only meant for a few 
people. This was made possible by laws like the Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953. 
This Act widened the gaps in educational opportunities for different racial groups 
because it provided a rationalization for keeping black education inferior and the white 
education superior (Byrnes, 1996). According to O’Brien as cited in Livingston (1983), 
the reason for the formulation of the Bantu Education Act was to create a docile 
population that will offer little assistance to policies meant to enrich the white minority in 
the country. Thus intrinsic in this objective is the idea that education is ideological.   
 
The then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr F.H Verwoed, believed that black Africans 
should not be educated for their opportunities in life. He was quoted as saying, “there is 
no place for black Africans above the level of certain forms of labor” (Byrnes, 1996). 
Black South Africans were regarded as laborers or servants during the apartheid era. The 
South African National Party tightened control over religious high schools. It eliminated 
almost all financial aid and thus forcing many churches to sell their schools to the 
government or close them entirely (Byrnes, 1996).  
 
The Educational gap between different racial groups was further widened by ideologies 
of organizations like the Christian National Education Board. This board passed a rule 
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emphasizing cultural diversity and the use of “mother-tongue” as a medium of instruction 
in the first years of primary school (South African Government Information, 2007). As a 
result some pupils dropped out of primary school despite the fact that it was the primary 
school level that introduces pupils to the broader process of formal education which 
helped in influencing them towards career choices. The mother tongue rule was quite 
anti-thetic to this. This led to an increase in the number of illiterate Black Africans. 
 
Tertiary education also suffered during the apartheid era. During this period there were 
ten universities in South Africa. Four were for the English only, four for Afrikaans, one 
was a bilingual correspondence university and one was a South African Native College of 
Fort Hare (South African Government Information, 2007). This means that the black 
people in South Africa inorder for them to further their education were supposed to be 
enrolled at the South African Native College of Fort Hare alone and nowhere else. This 
saw a large number of black South Africans not furthering their education. 
 
In 1959, the Extension of University Education Act (No. 45), of 1959, prohibited 
established universities for non-blacks from accepting black students. Black students 
could only be admitted with the special permission of a cabinet minister. The Non-whites 
were only to be admitted into a “whites” only university if their institution was 
overcrowded. The 1959 Act gave the central government control over the South African 
Native College of Fort Hare. It passed a new policy of admitting Xhosa students only at 
this university. This had major consequences for the black South Africans because they 
were not left with any choice but to end their education at secondary schools and many at 
primary level (Byrnes, 1996). 
 
The laws passed during the apartheid era led people to believe that the government’s 
attitude towards African education was based on telling people what to do, trusteeship 
and segregation. In general, black education was not supposed to drain government 
resources meant for educating the minority. In the 1960s there was an increase in the 
number of schools for blacks but their curriculum was designed to prepare children for 
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menial jobs. The schools were equipped with inferior facilities, unqualified teachers and 
shallow textbooks. 
 
In 1994, the new government abolished apartheid’s segregation laws. In order to address 
the backlogs left by forty years of apartheid education, more money was needed. The 
government made it a priority that education gets a bigger share of the government 
national budget, that is, around twenty percent (National Treasury, 1996). 
 
Through decentralization the provincial governments were mandated to create a single 
non discriminatory, non-racial system that offers the same standards of education to all 
people. The greatest challenges lie in poorer, rural provinces like the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu Natal. With this in mind the new government introduced the fee-free schools 
and the National Schools Nutrition programme. Although much has been done, apartheid 
imbalances are still persistent. The long and arduous process of restructuring the 
country's educational system was started in the mid 1990's and it is still ongoing.  
 
Education plays an important role in any society in promoting citizenship as well as 
facilitating the laying down of democratic principles for the society (Soudien 2006, p. 5). 
Moreover, it develops or prepares a citizenry with intellectual and moral qualities which 
meaningful participation in democracy requires (Kelly 1995, p. 105). The provincial 
governments still have a lot of challenges to overcome when it comes to the education 
system in South Africa. The illiteracy rates are presently high at around twenty four 
percent of persons over fifteen years. This means that six to eight million adults in South 
Africa are not functionally literate. Moreover, many teachers in township schools are 
poorly trained and this has made the matric pass rate to remain low. 
2.5 HEALTH 
 
During the Apartheid era, hospitals were assigned to particular racial groups and most of 
them were concentrated in white areas. Moreover, quality health care was a privilege of 
wealthy urban residents most of whom were white. In contrast, inferior services were 
designated for the poor, most of whom were blacks (South African Government 
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Information, 2007). During this period there was no real attempt to deliver primary health 
care to the majority of people. The health sector was largely focused around hospitals. 
Those living in rural areas had to travel long distances for medical care. At these 
hospitals, patients were admitted according to their racial group. There were wards for 
black patients only and these patients were given their own operating rooms (South 
African Government Information, 2007).  
 
Whites had access to special care facilities which the blacks were not allowed to benefit 
from. One good case is the allocation of doctors to patients. Wealthy white areas 
averaged one doctor per 1 200 people while for the poorest black homelands, the ratio 
was one doctor per 13 000 people during the apartheid era (Statssa, 2007). 
 
By the early 1990s deliberate racial distinctions began to disappear from hospital care in 
general. With the coming to an end of the apartheid era, the health care sector went 
through a rapid change to make it more equitable and accessible to everyone. From mid 
1994, the South African health system consisted of a large public sector and a smaller but 
fast growing private sector. In this case, health care varied from the most basic primary 
health care offered for free by the government to highly specialized health services 
available in the private sector for those who can afford it (South African Government 
Information, 2007).  
 
Service delivery by the public health sector has been crippled by the shortage of 
resources. To enable the health departments to continue operating, the health sector is 
annually allocated eleven percent of the government's total budget. This is shared 
amongst the health departments in the nine provinces (National Treasury, 1996). How 
these resources are allocated and the standard of health care delivered varies from 
province to province. Given the scarce resources and many people in need of this service, 
poor provinces like the Eastern Cape face greater health challenges than wealthier 
provinces like Gauteng and the Western Cape Province.    
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The incidence of tetanus, measles, malaria and other communicable diseases was high 
during the apartheid era in homelands. When former President Nelson Mandela came into 
power in 1994, he pushed for the building of more clinics and upgrading of those that 
were already there. He also made it a policy that there was free health care for children 
under the age of six, and for pregnant or breastfeeding mothers. Problems like 
malnutrition and starvation were dealt with through the introduction of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). RDP became the first socio-
economic macro policy that was gestated by the government to repair the disarticulation 
that was generated by apartheid policies in all spheres of society. Under the government's 
1994 blueprint for social and economic development, the RDP was given fourteen billion 
rands for improvements in the public health sector (Statssa, 2007). 
 
Although the provincial governments have done substantially much to make the health 
sector recover from imbalances that were created during the apartheid era, a lot still needs 
to be done. This demands the provincial governments to work harder. In December 1994, 
the then Minister of Health said that, “only twenty percent of South Africans do have 
access to health insurance”. This means that, at least eighty percent of the black African 
population does not have access to medical insurance in South Africa (South African 
Government Information, 2007), therefore, rely more on health services provided by the 
provincial government. 
2.6 HOUSING 
 
The government inherited imbalances and problems of house ownership and proper 
accommodation from the apartheid government (South African Government Information, 
2007). There was a critical housing backlog of 2 202 519 million houses according to the 
1996 population census (South African Government Information, 2007). These 
imbalances in house ownership between the white and the black population, placed 
housing at the forefront of the national agenda for delivery, hence, the new government 
took full responsibility in order to provide houses to the people. Moreover, the 
government’s goal was to create sustainable housing developments where in the long run 
people who cannot afford houses will be able to own their own houses.  
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In 1994, the government tried to solve the housing problem by building 1, 4 million 
houses, thereby providing five million people with secure accommodation. According to 
the South African Government Information (2007) the percentage of home owners in 
South Africa for the past eight years has risen from sixty six percent to seventy seven 
percent.  
 
Out of the total population, only fifty three percent live in urban areas (Statssa, 2007). 
The Human Settlement Redevelopment Programme was initiated in 1999. Its aim was to 
improve the quality of the urban environment and to address the imbalances as well as 
backlogs of housing inherited from the apartheid government. Through this programme, 
the South African government since independence has spent more than 40 million rands 
in all nine provinces (South African Government Information, 2007).  
 
Although the South African government has tried and is still trying to improve the 
availability of housing services to its citizens, there are still huge backlogs in this sector. 
This is evidenced today by the fact that at least seven million people in South Africa are 
still living in shacks (Statssa, 2007). This means that the provincial governments in South 
Africa have a lot of work to do in order to make sure that each and every person in their 
jurisdiction has safe and proper accommodation.  
2.7 SOCIAL WELFARE 
 
The National Welfare Act (No. 100) of 1978 established a coordinating council, the 
South African Welfare Council, to help manage the diverse programs of social welfare. 
These programs include, care for the disabled and the aged, alcohol and drug 
rehabilitation programs, previous offenders programs and child care services. In 1987, 
there were amendments to this act. This reflected the government’s growing awareness of 
the need to narrow differences in social welfare among racial groups. A good example is 
that, in the early 1990’s, the apartheid government spent at least 1 billion rands per year 
on welfare but half of this was spent on the white population yet it only accounts for 20 
percent of the total population (South African Government Information, 2007).  
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The post apartheid government in May 1994 introduced the RDP programme to deal with 
problems of social welfare. Under this programme, government spending was focused 
towards improving social welfare services for other racial groups that were ignored 
during the apartheid era (South African Government Information, 2007).  
 
Although, the new government tried to provide social services to the population groups 
that were neglected during the apartheid era, the outcomes have not been satisfactory. 
This is attributed mainly to corruption. People in real need of these social welfare 
services, especially social grants for old age pensioners and child support grants, are 
often not able to get them. To counter this corruption the central government has 
increased the budget for the social welfare departments. The aim is to improve services 
provided by the social welfare provincial governments in their respective jurisdictions 
(South African Government Information, 2007). 
 
Through the issuing of social welfare grants, the National and the Provincial governments 
are trying to improve the standards of living of poor South Africans. This means that both 
the national and the provincial governments are supposed to come up with ways to 
improve the efficiency of the social service delivery. Hence, the national government 
established the South African Social Security Agency to deal with the allocation of social 
grants. This board sees to it that the payment of social grants is more efficient and 
predictable, there is less or no corruption and that these social grants reach those who 
need them the most (South African Government Information, 2007). 
2.8 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
In 1994, the government inherited a society marred by deep social and economic 
inequalities as well as serious racial, political and social divisions. In order to solve these 
problems, the government introduced the Public Service Act in 1994. This act created the 
basis for integrating the fragmented system of state administration inherited from the 
apartheid era into a cohesive national public service (South African Government 
Information, 2007). 
 
22 
 
To counter these problems the new government committed itself to continually improve 
the lives of its citizens. It aimed to achieve this through a transformed public service 
which will be representative, rational, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and 
responsive to the needs of all the people of South Africa. This vision was backed by the 
government’s national unity’s mission of creating a people centered and people driven 
public service characterized by equity, quality, timeousness and a strong code of ethics 
service (South African Government Information, 2007). In actual fact, the laws and 
policies that were passed during the apartheid era and inherited by the new government 
were a stumbling block to the fulfillment of the above-mentioned vision and mission 
goals. 
 
According to the South African Government Information (2007), some of the problematic 
issues inherited from the Apartheid era are: 
a) Lack of representatives for all the people of South Africa in terms of race, gender 
and disability, 
b) Lack of popular legitimacy because the public officials were seen by the majority 
of South Africa’s communities as the agents of the apartheid government. This 
was mainly because they were employed by the apartheid government, 
c) Lack of service delivery. The system of service delivery that developed during the 
apartheid era was discriminatory and exclusionary, particularly towards black 
South Africans. Moreover, these public service officials were more concerned 
with the application of rules and procedures than with the development of a 
culture and ethos of service, 
d) Centralized control, during the apartheid era, the central government was the one 
that had the final say in the provision of services to the people, hence service 
delivery was biased towards the white population. Those who were employed to 
make sure that the services are delivered to people were only there to follow the 
rules and procedures from the government, and 
e) Lack of accountability and transparency. Accountability for service delivery was 
limited to bureaucratic structures. Moreover, employees were only held 
accountable to rules and procedures rather than for efficiency. 
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2.9 CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
 
Many of the problems that were created by the apartheid regime did not disappear 
when the Government of National Unity came into power in May 1994. For this new 
government to fulfill its mandate for efficient service delivery it had to overcome the 
problems that were created during the apartheid era as well the challenges that arose 
after independence. Some of these challenges were identified by (Skweyiya, 2007) of 
the Department of Public Service and Administration as:  
a) Fear of change : many public servants were worried about their future in the 
service and this had  a serious and negative impact on morale in the service 
departments, 
b) Lack of clear and well communicated vision of change and mission of the new 
government: because of this, employees did not know what they were 
expected to do and not to do, 
c) Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities: this had a serious impact on 
the three tiers of government and up to now there are still overlapping duties 
between these three levels of government, 
d) Lack of coordination: this was caused by the fact that there were no clear cut 
divisions of roles between the three tiers of government, 
e) Lack of skills and capacity: this was mainly due to the discriminatory effects 
of the apartheid education system. Another contributing factor towards this 
was lack of opportunities for in-service education and training for 
disadvantaged groups within the public service and this has had serious 
repercussions on capacity, and 
f) Financial constraints: the government of President Nelson Mandela gave rise 
to a situation where a greater portion of the national total budget was devoted 
to the salaries, wages and benefits of the public servants and only nine percent 
to project based development expenditure. In their bid to rectify this, the 
government tried to reduce the wage bill. The problem was that seventy 
percent of this total wage bill was devoted to priority areas of education, 
health and safety and security, hence this proved to be a tough task for this 
government. 
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2.10  BATHO PELE “SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE” 
 
From 1994, access to decent public services was no longer a privilege to be enjoyed by a 
few people. It was now being recognized as the rightful expectation of all citizens, 
especially those previously disadvantaged. For Zola Skweyiya, the Minister of Public 
Service and Administration, the new government had a vital and difficult task to do. It 
had to build a public service capable of meeting the challenge of improving the delivery 
of public services to the people of South Africa (Department of Public Services and 
Administration, 1997). 
 
Batho Pele is an ethos of service delivery that seeks to prioritize people.  It deals with the 
idea of improving the delivery of services. This means that the government should 
address the imbalances of the past and at the same time maintain continuity of service 
delivery to all levels of society. It should focus on meeting the needs of the fifty percent 
of South Africans who are living below the poverty3 line, the disabled and black women 
living in rural areas who have previously been disadvantaged in terms of service delivery 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2007). In addition, the officials responsible for the 
provision of these services are supposed to find ways that put the needs of the public first. 
Whichever way that they decide to use should be faster and more responsive to the needs 
of the citizens. In this case, one can expect the objectives of service delivery to include 
welfare, equity and efficiency.  
 
With the above mentioned task to fulfill, the new government came up with guiding 
“principle” of public service transformation. The principle is named, Batho Pele, 
meaning, “Service to the people”. According to the Department of Public Service and 
Administration, this transformation is based on 8 principles and these are:  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 In South Africa, poverty takes into account issues relating to income and material, employment 
deprivation, health and education deprivation as well as the quality of the environment in which people live 
(Statssa, 2001) 
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Table 2-5: Eight principles of Service Delivery Transformation. 
Consultation Citizens should be consulted about the level and quality of 
the public services they receive and, wherever possible, 
should be given a choice about the services that are 
offered. 
Service Standards Citizens should be told what level and quality of public 
services they will receive so that they are aware of what to 
expect. 
Access  All citizens should have equal access to the services to 
which they are entitled. 
Courtesy Citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration 
Information Citizens should be given full, accurate information about 
the public services they are entitled to receive. 
Openness and transparency Citizens should be told how national and provincial 
departments are run, how much they cost, and who is in 
charge. 
Redress If the promised standard of service is not delivered, 
citizens should be offered an apology, a full explanation 
and a speedy and effective remedy; and when complaints 
are made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, positive 
response. 
Value for money  
 
Public services should be provided economically and 
efficiently in order to give citizens the best possible value 
for money. 
 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 1997) 
 
The above mentioned Batho Pele principles were initiated by the new government in 
order to increase efficiency of service delivery to the people of South Africa. The main 
objective of these principles is to progressively raise standards of service delivery, 
especially for those whose access to public services was limited in the past and whose 
needs are greatest. 
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2.11  CONCLUSION 
 
From the above information, it is clear that education, health, housing and social welfare 
services were only meant for a few selected individuals in the past. Despite all the efforts 
by the new government to resolve these problems that were created by the apartheid 
regime, the illiteracy rates are still high, more than three quarters of the black South 
African population heavily depend on public health services. Many black South Africans 
still live in informal dwellings housing. This means that the new government tried is still 
trying to address the poverty gaps that were created during the apartheid era. The post 
apartheid government introduced the RDP programme to deal with problems associated 
with the provision of social services to the people of South Africa. Previously 
government spending was focused towards improving social welfare services for whites 
while other racial groups were ignored.  
 
Despite all these problems caused by apartheid, through governmental decentralization 
there is supposed to be, to a certain extent, an improvement in the service delivery to all 
South African citizens despite their race.  This is so because the closer the government is 
to the people the more efficient service delivery is supposed to be.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides an insight on both the theoretical and empirical literature on 
efficiency studies on the provision of social services by the sub-national government. The 
theoretical framework is based on the theorem of fiscal decentralization. This theorem 
states that, the closer the government is to the people, the more efficient the service 
delivery will be. Decentralization should be a combination of, political, administrative 
and fiscal decentralization. When all these forms of decentralization are combined, 
decentralization will, to a larger extent, contribute greatly towards efficient provision of 
public goods and services to citizens. In South Africa there are three levels of 
government, with the sub-national government which is closer to the people responsible 
for the provision of social services to the people. Decentralization of government is part 
of the policy package with which the South African government is trying to address the 
problems which were created during the apartheid era, where social services were meant 
for only a few selected people. The empirical section conducts a review of the literature 
on efficiency and the two main tools for empirical measurement: Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). This section explores studies, 
applications and observations that have been conducted by different authors in different 
countries in light of measuring efficiency in the provision of social services. 
3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.2.1 CONCEPTUALISING DECENTRALISATION 
 
In each and every country there is more than one level of government, that is, the central 
government and the sub-national government (Steffen and Larsen, 2005). The central 
government is the one at the top of the hierarchy. This means it exercises power over all 
the lower level governments. The sub-national government is at the lower level. It is 
made up of one or more levels of government. These are the provincial government and 
the local government. These sub-national governments have a major role to play in their 
respective jurisdictions in ensuring that there is efficient provision of public goods or 
services to the people in their jurisdictions. 
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Decentralization can be defined as the transfer of public authority, resources and 
personnel from the national level to sub-national jurisdictions (Ndegwa, 2002). This 
definition originated from the fact that the sub-national governments are now claiming 
greater autonomy as an extension of democratization. The notion of decentralizing 
governments emanated from countries whose governments were under pressure from 
external and internal demands to delegate functions and commitments in anticipation for 
a leaner, more efficient and enabling state. External pressures came from major 
development donors who argued that decentralization improves governance and service 
delivery. Furthermore, the internal pressures stemmed from within the central 
governments themselves. This is because statistically, the central governments have been 
associated with poor performance in service delivery for the last four decades (Ndegwa, 
2002). Hence, the central government saw the decentralization of authority, resources and 
personnel as an opportunity to make an improvement in the delivery of public goods and 
services to their citizens.   
 
Following the above discussion, fiscal decentralization can be seen as the empowerment 
of communities and citizens by fiscally empowering their sub-national governments. 
Generally, one can surmise that fiscal decentralization deals with how and in what way 
expenditures and revenues can be divided between and across different spheres of 
government. Therefore, the concept of fiscal decentralization also covers the extent to 
which the sub-national governments are empowered in terms of authority and control that 
they exercise over the use and management of financial resources. According to Steffen 
and Larsen (2005), the extent to which the sub-national governments are empowered by 
the national government is measured by looking at the extent to which the sub-national 
government has control over: 
a. The amount of public goods and services that the sub-national government 
provide to the people in its jurisdiction, 
b. The extent to which sub-national governments are able to raise revenue from their 
own sources in order to provide public goods and services to its citizens, and 
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c. The extent to which these sub-national governments are dependent on the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers to fill in the vertical as well as the horizontal 
fiscal gaps. 
For fiscal decentralization to show efficient results in the provision of public services and 
goods, the central government should make sure that it is backed with political and 
administrative decentralization. Firstly, this will be possible if the sub-national 
government is democratically elected. This makes the government more accountable to 
the people under its jurisdiction in the provision of public goods and services. Secondly, 
the sub-national government should have administrative powers over its staff as well as 
services that it provides so that they will provide these public services and goods in an 
efficient way.  
3.2.2 PRINCIPLES OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
 
According to Boex (2005), fiscal decentralization can be divided into four building 
blocks or pillars and these are: 
 
Figure 3-1: Four pillars of decentralization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Boex, 2005) 
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a. The assignment of expenditure responsibilities: this deals with the division of 
functions between the central and the sub-national government. This division of 
functions is based on the subsidiarity principle. This principle states that the 
provision of public goods or services should be provided by the level of 
government that is capable of providing them to the citizens in an efficient 
comportment; 
b. The assignment of tax and revenue sources to the central government and the sub-
national government: after the division of functions between the different levels 
of government, the only obstacle between the sub-national government and the 
efficient provision of services and goods is revenue. Therefore, this pillar deals 
with what revenue sources are supposed to be assigned to the sub-national 
government. In actual fact, this is because some taxes are more suited for the 
central government, in particular value added tax. On the other hand, some of the 
taxes that are appropriate for the sub-national government to administer are the 
real estate property taxes and user charges. This assignment of revenue follows 
the adage, ‘finance should follow function’;   
c. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers: despite the fact that the sub-national 
governments have their own sources of revenue from which they can provide 
goods and services, these revenues are often not enough thereby creating fiscal 
gaps. These fiscal gaps can be closed by intergovernmental transfers and they 
usually come in the form of conditional or unconditional transfers; and 
d. Sub-national deficits, borrowing and debt: if sub-national governments fail to 
provide goods and services to the people in their jurisdiction with all the resources 
that they have, that is, their own funds and transfers from the central government, 
they risk incurring deficits. This means that the sub-national governments will 
only have one option of borrowing. Borrowing usually causes most sub-national 
governments to accumulate debt, and, this accumulation of debt tends to have 
negative effects on the macroeconomic conditions of the country. As a result, the 
sub-national governments in most developing countries are not allowed to borrow 
by the central government (Boex, 2005). 
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3.2.3 TYPES OF DECENTRALISATION  
 
There are three main forms of decentralization and these are political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralization (Litvack, 2007). 
a. Political decentralization: the elected government officials as well as the citizens 
who voted have a part to play in the public decision making. For this political 
decentralization to be efficient in the provision of public goods and services to the 
entire population, the sub-national government elections should be free and fair. 
From the above statement, it is clear that one of the assumptions that underlies 
decentralization is that, decisions made with greater participation by both the sub-
national government officials and the rest of the population will be better 
informed and more relevant to different interests in society than those decisions 
made only by the national political authorities, (Litvack, 2007).  
b. Administrative decentralization: this seeks to redistribute responsibility and 
financial resources for providing public services and goods among the different 
levels of government (Litvack, 2007). There are three types of administrative 
decentralization which are deconcentration, delegation and devolution.  
i. Deconcentration: is often referred to as the weakest form of 
decentralization. It is used to transfer the decision making function, 
financial and management roles from the central government to the sub-
national governments. Under this form of decentralization, the sub-
national government officials are directly under the supervision of the 
central government officials, thus, the real decision making remains with 
the central government, 
ii. Delegation: the central government transfers decision making and the 
administration of public goods and services to a non-governmental entity 
which is not under the control of the central government. For instance, the 
central government will delegate some of its functions by creating public 
enterprises, like housing authorities and regional development 
corporations and 
iii. Devolution: the central government transfers authority for decision 
making and powers to raise their own revenue to the sub-national 
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government. For this form of administrative decentralization to work 
efficiently the people are supposed to elect their own representatives and 
these elected government officials should have access to their own sources 
of revenue. 
c. Fiscal decentralization: this is an important form of decentralization. For the sub-
national governments to be able to provide services to the people in their 
jurisdictions efficiently, they are given powers to raise their own revenue from : 
i. Self financing: that is, the sub-national government will raise their own 
revenue from providing services to the people in their jurisdiction. A good 
example, is that of user chargers,  
ii. Co-financing and co-production: this is when citizens that are wealthy 
help the sub-national government in providing public services and goods 
to the rest of the population in the form of monetary labour contributions, 
iii. The sub-national governments will also get their revenue when the central 
government expands their tax base, for example, by allowing them to 
charge property or sales tax, 
iv. The common source of the sub-national government revenue is the 
intergovernmental transfers. These transfers shift general revenues from 
taxes collected by the central government to the sub-national government. 
In addition, in developing countries the tax base for the sub-national 
government is so weak, that they strongly depend on the central 
government for transfers, and 
v. When the revenue collected by the sub-national governments as well as 
revenue from intergovernmental transfers is not enough for the sub-
national government to provide goods and services to the people in their 
jurisdiction, the sub-national government will have to borrow. And this 
can only be done with the approval of the central government. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that for decentralization to contribute towards 
efficiency in the provision of public goods and services it should be a combination of 
political, administrative as well as fiscal decentralization. For decentralization to 
contribute towards an efficient provision of public goods and services it should first get 
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an extensive participation of the citizens as well as government officials in the relevant 
processes. 
3.2.4 ADVANTAGES OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
Many economists are for the notion that every country should have a leaner government 
in order for it to efficiently provide public goods and services to its citizens (Bahl and 
Linn 1992, p. 4). Some of the advantages of decentralization according to Bahl and Linn 
(1992, p. 4) are: 
a. Decentralization brings the government closer to the people. This allows for an 
increased participation in decision making by the sub-national government. More 
importantly, through decentralization the sub-national governments become 
accountable for the public goods and services that they provide to the people in 
their jurisdiction. Accountability to citizens promotes a demand driven service 
delivery. Decentralisation also recognises and allows space for local knowledge.  
Moreover, citizens are more than willing to pay for public goods or services that  
satisfy their preferences 
b. Decentralization makes the sub-national government responsible for effectively 
collecting revenue from areas that are outside the central government’s tax net. 
This means that the central governments allow the sub-national governments to 
collect taxes which are easy to administer. A good example of these taxes is the 
property tax and other land based taxes. Furthermore, the central governments 
allow the sub-national governments to collect taxes from small firms that are 
legally exempted from income tax and value added tax. It also allows the sub-
national governments to collect tax from those workers outside the formal sector 
who usually escape taxation, 
c. Decentralization promotes fiscal experiments by the sub-national government in 
their regions. This means that the sub-national governments are in a position to 
carry out experiments in the implementation of certain policies that might never 
have been implemented by the central government or other sub-national 
governments. If these experiments are successful, they may act as models for later 
implementation by the central government and other sub-national governments in 
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their jurisdictions. This idea of implementing different policies in different 
regions means that all the sub-national governments as well as the central 
government can find which policies work better compared to others, 
d. The other advantage of decentralization is that it promotes political participation 
through the sub-national governments. By decentralizing its government system, a 
country may be viewed as a democratic country by both the outside world and its 
own people. This is crucial for national political stability. Moreover, 
decentralization can act as a spring board for upcoming politicians as it is often a 
good training ground for national leadership (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999, p. 
98). 
3.2.5 DISADVANTAGES OF DECENTRALISATION  
 
Although decentralization can have some positive effects, it also has some shortcomings. 
Economists who identified loopholes in decentralization are in support of centralization 
in the provision of public goods and services to the citizens. For Kee (2003), some of the 
disadvantages of decentralization are: 
a. The sub-national government may not be able to fully collect revenue in the form 
of taxes from their jurisdictions. Many sub-national governments lack personnel 
with the expertise in tax or budget choices, 
b. The fact that these sub-national governments are closer to the people means that 
they can be more corrupt or they can find themselves in more corrupting 
positions, than national politicians. For instance, the sub-national governments are 
often more corrupt when it comes to the issuing of tenders to private companies. 
Hence, if the government is centralized corruption is easier to uncover through 
central government oversight,   
c. In developing countries, decentralization is often earmarked by the overlapping of 
functions between the central and the sub-national government. This may cause 
citizens to lose confidence in their local government since they may see it as an 
agent of the central government. This overlapping of functions frequently leads to 
competition between the central government and the sub-national governments 
especially in the collection of revenue. The reason is there will be a reduction in 
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the amount of taxes to be collected by the central government. This definitely 
compromises the country’s economy, 
d. There are some regions that have abundant natural resources like gold and 
diamonds deposits. Sub-national governments in these areas have more resources 
as compared to those in poor regions. A good example is the difference in 
resource endowment between the rural and urban based sub-national 
governments. In this case, it is better for the central government to take over the 
collection of revenue because it is in a better position to distribute income 
equitably to all the sub-national governments. That is, central government can 
take part of the revenue from the wealthy regions and distribute it to poor regions, 
e. The central government is better positioned than the sub-national governments to 
build and develop national infrastructure. If this is left to be administered by the 
sub-national government some regions may become better off in terms of 
infrastructure than the others, and 
f. Overall, control by the central government often result in more control over the 
entire fiscal policy, economic stability and macroeconomic conditions. 
The arguments against decentralization above also vary in different settings, that is, in 
developed and developing countries. Therefore, by looking at the above arguments it is 
clear that they are more applicable to the developing countries. For decentralization to be 
successful, the above mentioned advantages of decentralization can be enjoyed if the sub-
national governments in developing countries’ government structures should have some 
of the characteristics named below (Bahl and Linn 1994, p. 4): 
a) Enough workers with the required skills and access to revenue sources that 
can give the sub-national governments  enough resources to enable it to 
provide public goods and services to their citizens  when desired, 
b) An efficient tax administration,  
c) Taxing powers sufficient to capture significant portions of community 
income increments 
d) An income elastic demand for public services, 
e) Freely and fairly elected sub-national government officials, and 
f) Some local discretion in shaping the budget and setting the tax rate 
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These conditions exist in developing countries, but they are mainly found in large cities 
and natural resource rich regions. This implies that with decentralization one can have 
different results from different regions of the same country. 
3.2.6 ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF THE GOVERNMENT  
 
The government provides a variety of services. Among them are housing, education, 
health, security and defence. It also administers the system of justice as well as the laws 
which are provided through the legal system and constitution. The extent to which 
governments get involved in providing goods and services via the budget and the 
services they actually provide vary from country to country. This also varies over time. 
The government deals with a large number of different roles and they are often in 
conflict (Brown and Jackson, 1990). 
 
In this modern era, governments in every country are made up of at least three spheres. 
For decentralization to be effectively implemented within a country, all the roles that are 
supposed to be performed by the central government, should be divided amongst all the 
three spheres. Division of functions between these different spheres is based on the 
decentralization theorem. This theorem states that, “for public goods or services, if their 
consumption is over different geographical regions of the total population and the cost 
of providing these public goods or services in each region are the same for both the 
central government as well as the sub-national government, it will always be more 
efficient for these services to be provided by the sub-national government to their 
respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified or 
uniform level of output across all jurisdictions”, (Oates, 2006). 
 
Overall, there are three functions that are supposed to be performed by the national 
government of every country. These roles should be divided between the central 
government and the sub-national government.  Musgrave (1959) identified these roles as: 
a. The stabilization function: deals with the macroeconomic stability of the economy 
within a country. This entails the managing of the overall level of the economic 
activity by deciding on tax and the spending policies as well as the monetary 
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policy of the country in order to reduce inflation and unemployment. For the 
stability of the economy to be maintained, the government responsible for this 
function should have access to a wide tax band. This function can be best 
performed by the central government, because they have the resources to employ 
the manpower with the right expertise needed in the collection of taxes. In 
addition, the central government is the only level of government which is in a 
good position to collect taxes on a national basis, good examples of these taxes 
are value added tax and income tax. 
b. The distribution function: this entails the distribution of income, wealth and any 
other economic resource. The idea is to have a more equitable economic resource 
distribution across all regions of the country. In every country, there are some 
regions that are rich and there are some that are poor. Thus, if the collection of 
revenue is left in the hands of the sub-national governments, people in the wealthy 
regions continue to get rich whilst those in the poor regions get poorer. This is a 
situation that every government is tries to avoid. Thus, this function of income or 
wealth distribution should be left to the central government. For  Kee (2003), this 
function should be carried out by the national government only if the following  
assumptions are in place: 
i. The national or central government has broad taxing powers which means 
it can easily redistribute income and wealth, and 
ii. If the ability of the tax payers to move from one jurisdiction to another in 
order to take advantage of more attractive spending and taxation policies 
weakens the sub-national government’s ability to, “soak the rich and 
redistribute to the poor.  
If the above mentioned assumptions are violated, this role may better be 
performed by the sub-national government. Moreover, if the market fails to 
produce a socially just and equitable distribution of welfare, the government 
should intervene to bring the distribution of incomes in line with what is 
considered to be “just and fair” (Brown and Jackson, 1990). 
c. The allocation function: this deals with the decision making on how the 
government should best combine the public goods and services that they provide 
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to their citizens. It also concerns the correction of market failures caused by the 
free market ability to generate a socially optimal distribution of income and 
welfare as well as efficient allocation of resources. These public goods and 
services can be provided in an efficient way by both the central government and 
the sub-national government. The classic argument provided by Oates (1972) is 
that, in a democratic society, decentralisation results in a better match of supply 
and demand for local public goods and services. By being closer to the people, the 
sub-national government can easily identify people’s needs and be in a position to 
supply these public services in an efficient manner.  
 
There are some public goods or services that should be provided by the central 
government alone. A good example of these services is the national defense and police 
services. On the other hand, some of the public goods or services that the sub-national 
government should provide are education, health, housing and social welfare. By 
decentralizing some of its functions to the sub-national government, the central 
government should give them revenue sources. This means they should give the sub-
national government powers to collect their own revenue. This allocation of revenue 
sources to the sub-national government has led many economists to worry about 
efficiency, vertical imbalances, horizontal equity and externalities. In addition, the public 
management’s main concern is the overlapping of taxes between the central and the sub-
national governments, responsiveness to the needs of citizens and accountability for 
services they deliver to the citizens by the sub-national government.  
 
The above discussion gives a good framework upon which the revenue sources are to be 
allocated to each government level. The main source of revenue for both the central and 
the sub-national government is taxes. This is based upon the public finance principle, 
that, “finance should follow function”. If these revenue sources are not enough to cover 
all the expenditures allocated to each sub-national government, central government 
should provide this revenue in the form of intergovernmental transfers. Hence, from the 
above mentioned roles the central government will be in a position to calculate the 
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formulae upon which horizontal or vertical distribution of revenue should be based for 
each level of government at the sub-national sphere. 
 
The most important objective of the South African Government is to ensure that the 
quality of life of South African citizens is promoted (Niekerk, Waldt and Jonker, 2001). 
This can be achieved through the provision of social services in an efficient way. This 
objective is supported by the constitution of the Republic of South Africa and Act 108 of 
1996, (National Treasury, 1996), which states that the government should: 
a) Lay the foundation for a democratic and open society in which the government is 
based on the will of the people and make sure that every South African citizen is 
equally protected by the law, and 
b) Improve the quality of life of all citizens, especially for those people who were 
disadvantaged during the apartheid era. 
According to Yemek (2005), the policies that ensure that these services are made 
available to the people have to be valued, translated into budgetary programmes and 
prioritized through resource allocations to the sub-national government which will be 
responsible for the provision of public goods and services to the citizens. 
3.2.7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL STRUCTURE 
3.2.7.1 BUDGET PROCESS 
 
A budget can simply be defined as a plan for raising and spending money by the 
government. According to the Geocite (2007), the budget is important because: 
 
a) Without the financial means to implement government policies nothing would be 
achieved. The sub-national governments should have resources in order for it to 
provide goods and services to the people in its jurisdictions. Moreover, the budget 
links the financial resources of the government with its goals, 
b) Budget determination lies at the heart of the political process. It deals with the 
allocation of revenue between the different spheres of government. That is, 
expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, the vertical imbalance and the 
horizontal imbalance. 
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c) Budgets imply limits, constraints and scarcity. This means that the government 
should try to provide goods and services to its citizens in an efficient way given 
the limited resources that they have, and 
d) Budgets reveal values. Given the limited resources that they have, the 
governments maybe forced to prioritize some services and goods over others. For 
example, in most developing countries, education is at the top of the list and as a 
result, a larger portion of the resources is channelled towards the provision of 
education and other social services. 
From the definition and significance of the budget as mentioned above, it means for the 
government to be able to achieve all its functions, that is, stabilization, allocative and 
distributive roles, they are supposed to table a budget, which is a summary of intended 
expenditures accompanied by proposals on how to meet them. According to Brown and 
Jackson (1990), the budget contains an implicit expression or statement of the objectives 
and aspirations of the political party in power. It contains a package of public expenditure 
plans and tax legislation for the next year. In the South African case, the Minister of 
Finance, Mr Trevor Manuel, outlines the national budget every year in February stating 
the government spending, tax and borrowing plans for the coming three years. The South 
African budget is formulated within the context of the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF)4 (Department of Finance, 2005). 
 
In South Africa, the budget allocates revenue among the three spheres of government. 
Every sphere has to make sure that the people under its jurisdiction have access to the 
public goods and services that it provides. The central government is responsible for the 
provision of public services such as defence, police, higher education and the judicial 
courts. The provincial government and the local government as noted by the Minister of 
Finance, Mr Trevor Manuel, “are in the frontline in providing the many services required 
by people”, (National Treasury, 2005). This means that the sub-national government is 
                                                 
4
 
The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is a rolling process repeated every year and it aims at reducing the imbalances between what is affordable and 
what is demanded by line ministries. MTEF does this by bringing together policy-making, planning, and budgeting early in the budgeting cycle, with adjustments 
taking place through policy changes. A well implemented MTEF should: (i) link the Government’s priorities with a budget within a sustainable spending envelope; 
(ii) highlight the tradeoffs between the competing objectives of the Government; (iii) link budgets with the policy choices made; and (iv) improve outcomes by 
increasing transparency, accountability, and the predictability of funding.
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responsible for the implementation of the various policies set by the government 
according to the nationally determined framework. The South African National 
Government is largely responsible for providing leadership, formulating policies, 
determining the regulatory frameworks which include setting minimum norms and 
standards and therefore monitoring overall implementation by the provincial government 
(National Treasury, 2003). 
 
For the past years there has been a joint responsibility between the local and provincial 
government in the provision of services like health and housing. In the 2005 budget the 
central government gave accreditation to the local government as delivery centres for the 
housing services and for the provision of local services such as water sanitation. The 
national government also shifted all the primary health functions to provincial levels. The 
provincial governments were made responsible for the functioning of schools and the 
provision of social welfare services (National Treasury, 2005). 
 
All these services provided by the sub-national government to the public on behalf of the 
national government need revenue. This revenue is allocated among the three spheres of 
government through the budget. Since the sub-national governments are responsible for 
the provision of a larger number of basic services, they therefore receive a bigger portion 
of nationally raised revenue. The provincial government is more dependent on the 
governmental transfers as compared to the local government. This is so because the 
provincial governments are not capable of raising much revenue on their own, as 
compared to the local government. For example, in South Africa the provincial 
governments are only able to raise at least four percent of their own revenue and the local 
government can raise sixty to ninety percent of their own revenue (National Treasury, 
2003). 
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the provincial government has a major 
responsibility in the provision of education, health, social welfare, inter municipal issues, 
and in supervising the local governments. Amid the limited resources that the provincial 
government is able to raise on its own, it means that they rely more on the revenue from 
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the central government which comes in the form of intergovernmental transfers.  
3.2.7.2 DIVISION OF REVENUE 
 
Revenue generation is unequally distributed between the national government and the 
sub-national government in most developing countries. This means that the sub-national 
governments are not able to raise all the revenue needed for them to provide goods and 
services to the people in their jurisdictions in an efficient manner.  
 
In the fiscal year 2005/06 the revenue for the provincial governments in South Africa 
from their own sources amounted close to three percent (Yemek, 2005). Looking at the 
tax base of the sub-national government and the ability of the provincial government to 
raise their own revenue, it means that they are supposed to generate their revenue from 
somewhere for them to be able to efficiently provide public goods and services to the 
people under their jurisdictions. This assistance in revenue comes in the form of 
intergovernmental transfers; these transfers are often proportional to the ability of each 
sphere in raising its own revenue. These transfers also serve the purpose of distributing 
wealth from wealthy regions to poor regions and funding programs that deal with 
regional backlogs (Yemek, 2005). 
 
The budget allocates revenue between the three spheres of government through a vertical 
or a horizontal formula. According to the National Treasury, (2003), the vertical division 
of revenue and the different roles that are performed by each level of government 
determine the percentage of revenue that the sub-national government receives from the 
central government. In addition, this vertical division also depends on the ability of the 
sub-national governments to raise its own revenue. This is the reason why provincial 
governments get a large percentage of their revenue from the government. The horizontal 
division of revenue uses a formula to determine an equitable share which will go to each 
province and this formula takes into account the characteristics of each province. 
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3.2.7.3 VERTICAL REVENUE SHARING 
 
The vertical fiscal imbalances in the sub-national governments exist because the revenue 
that they have and the services that they are supposed to provide do not match. Under the 
vertical division of revenue there is no formula for revenue sharing among the national, 
provincial, and local government. In every country each sphere of government is entitled 
to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally. 
 
The reason for this vertical division of revenue is due to the mismatch of functions and 
finances (Litvack and Seddon, 2006). This is often referred to as the ‘vertical imbalance’. 
The existence of this vertical imbalance is the reason why sub-national governments are 
generally dependent on transfers from higher levels of government. Bird and Smart 
(2001) argues that ‘money is at the heart of intergovernmental matters’.  
 
An imbalance between the revenue raising ability of sub-national governments and their 
responsibilities can be caused by two factors. First, there may be an inappropriate 
assignment of taxing and spending responsibilities that put the expenditure needs of sub-
national governments above their revenue needs. Secondly, some taxes are more 
efficiently collected at the central level. Thus, in order to avoid tax competition and 
interprovincial tax distortions, transfers are necessary. They enable local levels to carry 
out their expenditure responsibilities (Litvack and Seddon, 2006). 
 
The vertical division of revenue is a policy judgement that reflects the relative priority of 
functions assigned to each sphere of government and for this reason it cannot be captured 
in a formula. According to the National Treasury (2003), the vertical division of revenue 
and the different roles that are performed by each sphere of government in a decentralised 
country determine the percentage of revenue that the sub-national government will 
receive from the central government.  
 
In contrast to the provincial government, the local government is capable of raising 96 % 
of their own revenue (National Treasury, 2003). In vertically sharing the revenue 
collected at the central level, the national government takes into consideration the 
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economic and social impact of services, the efficiency with which extra funds are spent 
by the sub-national government and the scope for savings within budgets. By looking at 
the above conditions for vertical revenue sharing, it is clear that the provincial 
governments in South Africa are more dependent on the intergovernmental transfers than 
the local government. In addition, the vertical division of revenue in South Africa is 
guided by section 14 of the Constitution and in consultation with the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission as well as the provincial governments (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 
2007). Below is an example of the South African vertical division of revenue: 
 
Table 3-1: Vertical Division of Revenue 
RANDS (BILLIONS) 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
National Allocation 98.9 109.0 117.5 126.3 
Provincial Allocation 136.9 159.0 175.5 191.6 
Local Government Allocation 8.8 12.0 13.2 14.6 
Total Allocation 244.6 280.0 306.3 332.5 
 (National Treasury, 2007) 
 
3.2.7.4 HORIZONTAL REVENUE SHARING 
 
This division of revenue addresses the issue of fiscal inequity among the sub-national 
governments. According to the studies carried out by the World Bank (2006), countries 
that value horizontal equity are in dire need of correcting fiscal inequity that naturally 
arises in a decentralised system. 
 
The horizontal division of revenue enables the central government to solve the issue of 
horizontal imbalances thereby promoting equity between provinces. The problem of 
‘horizontal imbalances’ is that they occur because of differences in resource capacity and 
needs of every region. For example, the tax base differs significantly between regions. 
Furthermore, the needs for public services and goods also tend to differ because some 
areas, for example, may have a higher percentage of children or elderly people than 
others. According to Bird and Smart (2001), designing fiscal institutions to cope with this 
complex reality is often problematic. It is often exacerbated by government tendency to 
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treat unequal jurisdictions uniformly. Worse still, historically embedded conflicts and 
rivalries between regions and population groups adversely affect the process. 
 
Although decentralisation tends to exaggerate revenue differences among sub-national 
jurisdictions, it is seen as the only way to alleviate poverty. This scenario is explained by 
two factors (World Bank, 2006). The first is horizontal equity, which is the extent to 
which sub-national governments have the fiscal capacity to deliver an equivalent level of 
services to their population. The second is within-state equity, which is the ability or 
willingness of the sub-national governments to improve income distribution within their 
borders. 
 
Horizontal equity is connected to the issue of equalisation grants. Tax bases usually vary 
significantly between the national and the sub-national government. The provincial 
governments have access to a small tax base. Due to differences in resource endowment 
across regions some provincial governments are able to collect more revenue than others. 
This means that those jurisdictions with a relatively small tax base cannot compensate by 
imposing much high tax rates without losing businesses and residents to jurisdictions 
with lower taxes. The costs of providing public services may also vary due to, for 
instance, population density and geographic location.  
 
In order to correct the horizontal imbalances, many countries have introduced 
equalisation grants. This facilitates the channelling of funds from relatively wealthy 
jurisdictions to poorer ones. Fjeldstad (2001, p. 127), believes that transfers are often 
based on an equalisation formula that measures the ‘fiscal capacity’ and the ‘fiscal need’ 
of each province or local authority. The horizontal sharing of revenue is based on the 
distributional principles which are; population and basic needs, compensation to 
producing areas for costs of production namely environmental dilapidation and 
displacement, infrastructure required for production, that is, road services and houses.  
According to the World Bank (2006), in many countries, income inequality is due to the 
differences between individuals within a province rather than differences between 
different provincial governments. According to Ravallion (2004), redistribution of 
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revenue across regions may have limited results unless targeting is improved within 
regions themselves. This notion put forward by Ravallion can be linked to the issue of 
fiscal capacity5 of the sub-national government. Fiscal capacity determines the allocation 
of intergovernmental transfers in order to equalize the amount of resources available to 
each region or province.  Nonetheless, this depends on the ability and willingness of the 
sub-national jurisdictions to engage in redistribution. This is because jurisdictions with 
the same fiscal capacities can raise different revenues due to different tax rates and also 
due to variances in the enforcement effort with which revenues are collected. Therefore, 
one can construe that the potential effort of the sub-national governments to collect 
revenue is influenced by the economic structure of the region and the presence of taxable 
resources or tax bases (Vazquez and Boex, 1997). 
 
In South Africa, the horizontal division of revenue is based on an explicit revenue sharing 
formula. This formula guides the distribution of revenue among the nine provinces of the 
country based on their demographic and economic profiles. Demographic and economic 
profiles help indicate the demand for basic services within each province. The share 
allocated to each province should enable it to provide the nationally mandated basic 
levels of education, health and welfare services (Yemek, 2005).  The equitable share 
formula was introduced in the 1997 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement. The 
equitable share formula of South Africa is made up of seven components which reflect 
the policy priority and demand by both the national and the sub-national government 
(Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2007). These components are shown in the table 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Fiscal capacity of the sub-national government can be defined as the potential ability of these 
governments to raise revenue from their own sources in order to pay for a standardised basket of public 
goods and services. 
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Table 3-2: Equitable Share Formula 
COMPONENT PERCENTAGE 
EDUCATION 41 
HEALTH 19 
SOCIAL SECURITY 17 
BASIC SHARE (TOTAL POPULATION) 7 
BACKLOG 3 
ECONOMIC OUTPUT 8 
INSTITUTIONAL 5 
 (National Treasury, 2005) 
 
3.2.7.5 INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS OR GRANTS 
 
In nearly all systems of fiscal federalism, there is some imbalance in expenditures and 
revenues. Low levels of government typically generate their own tax revenues. These 
revenues often fall short of their levels of spending. This gap is then filled by transfers 
from the central government. The use of these intergovernmental transfer grants has 
become a prominent feature of modern fiscal federalism (Oates, 1998). According to 
Oates (1998), in the United States, the sub-national government received about $120 
billion in grants from the federal government in 1989 and this accounted roughly for 
sixteen percent of the sub-national receipts. On the other hand, according to Brown and 
Jackson (1990), fifty percent of the United Kingdom current revenues come from 
transfers. These two examples show that intergovernmental grants play an important role 
in the provision of services and goods by the sub-national government. This is so because 
they are viewed as a means by which countries can compromise a desire of the central 
government to expand services, to equalize local incomes or to make greater use of the 
central government tax base without directly assuming the functional spending 
responsibilities of lower levels of government. 
 
For Bird (2001, p. 26), intergovernmental fiscal transfers are neither intrinsically good 
nor bad. The reason is that what matters most, is their effects on policy outcomes such as 
allocative efficiency, distributional equity and macroeconomic stability. If, for example, 
48 
 
the sole objective of fiscal decentralisation is the efficiency in the delivery of public 
services then what matters is how transfers affect the efficiency of the public sector 
operations in the provision of public goods and services. The most critical aspect of 
intergovernmental transfers is thus not where they come from and who gets them, but 
their impact on policy objectives. Moreover, the design of these transfers is of critical 
importance for efficiency and equity of local service provision and fiscal health of sub-
national governments. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two methods that can be used to measure efficiency. These are the 
deterministic approach and the stochastic frontier. A number of studies have used the 
DEA model to measure health and education efficiency. This is because of the capability 
of DEA to distinguish efficient Decision Making Units (DMUs)6 from the ones that are 
inefficient in a way that is consistent with the economic concept of technical efficiency. 
The exciting part is that when measuring efficiency of different organizations their 
variables do not need to be in common units such as rands or dollars. In fact DEA can be 
used at the cost centre level and produce a measure of relative efficiency against an 
efficient standard. Although DEA has been applied extensively to health and education 
efficiency, it has its minor shortcomings. The most common disadvantage being that the 
analytic technique is less familiar to health and education administrators than other 
techniques such as ratio analysis. Following this, literature from researchers that have 
extensively applied the DEA model to measuring efficiency of the education and health 
sectors will be reviewed. Moreover, some of the deterministic approaches that can be 
used to measure efficiency will be mentioned but not critically discussed.  
3.3.2 EFFICIENCY DEFINED 
 
Efficiency is one of the most frequently and widely used concepts in economic theory. 
This is because economic processes and dynamic and static equilibria involving 
                                                 
6
 In this context a Decision Making Unit (DMU) refers to the departments in the provincial government 
responsible for the provision of social services. 
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allocation of scarce resources are evaluated from the viewpoint of efficiency. In this 
research efficiency is defined as the ratio of output to input. In any production process, 
the goal is to maximize efficiency (Hedley 1998, p. 251). The above mentioned 
relationship can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 3-2: Production process in the government sector 
                                                    EFFICIENCY 
 
                      
  
       
 
 
 
(Hedley 1998, p. 251) 
 
In the private sector, an output price in excess of input costs would reflect a process 
efficient to justify continued production. This is not easily applicable to the government 
sector; hence, the measuring of efficiency for the public sector is a more complicated 
task. This is because in most cases, input costs of public services significantly exceed the 
price paid for output. For example, welfare services are usually distributed for “free” to 
the eligible recipients (McGowan 1984, p. 162). 
 
Through efficiency the government strives to improve public services in order to pursue 
societal goals. Thus, in order to guarantee the quality of public services provided to the 
people, the government needs to create efficiency incentives. One of these incentives is 
decentralization. With decentralisation, citizens contribute in the provision of public 
services through their participation and making of choices pertaining to the types of 
services that they want. The table below shows how the quality of services can be 
affected by the government and citizens: 
 
 
 
Output (Expenditure 
on goods and services 
Inputs (Revenue) 
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Figure 3-3: Who can affect the quality of public services? 
INSTITUTION GOVERNMENT CITIZENS 
Motivation Pursue societal goals Desire for consumer 
satisfaction 
Mechanism Incentive mechanism (delegating 
power to local self government 
through decentralization) 
 
Enforcement mechanisms through 
legislation and administrative controls. 
Participation; 
Freedom of choice 
(democratic elections) 
 
Freedom of movement 
(“voting by feet”) 
(Sytnyk, 1999) 
 
Sytnyk (1999) argues that decentralization can improve efficiency because it allows sub-
national governments to decide on a variety of taxes and service packages. An increase in 
the services that will be provided by a decentralized government will create an incentive 
for the citizens to “vote with their feet”. This means that consumer preferences will be 
satisfied to a larger extent. This alone suggests that decentralization leads to an improved 
efficiency in social service provision. This improvement can be realized only if the 
procedures for public participation are set. 
3.3.3 MEASURING EFFICIENCY 
 
Improving public sector efficiency is a major concern for governments all over the world. 
This means that the problem of improving the provision of social services is of top 
priority to all countries. Hence many governments take action by developing and 
implementing sound policies. All this requires clear and precise measures of efficiency.  
                                                                                                                                      
The measuring of the public sector’s provision of public goods and services is complex. 
It uses a lot of inputs and renders myriad services. There are two approaches that can be 
used to measure the efficiency of the public sector. These are the deterministic approach 
(DA) and the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) (Tandon, 2005). The major difference 
between these two is that, in the deterministic approach, the frontier is estimated such that 
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all the estimated data points lie below it (Tandon, 2005). Points on the frontier are 
efficient whereas those below the frontier are attributed to inefficiency. In the stochastic 
approach points below the frontier can be attributed to factors other than inefficiency, for 
example, measurement errors. This research is going to use the deterministic approach 
only because of the weaknesses posed by the stochastic frontier approach. Some of these 
weaknesses as highlighted by the United Nations (2007) are: 
 
a) The functional form of the stochastic frontier analysis is not initially 
selected, so one should select it arbitrarily using the available information 
on behavioural assumptions of estimated DMUs such as cost minimization 
and profit maximization, 
b) In SFA, the distribution form of the random variable describing a technical 
inefficiency of an organization is also not initially selected. This increases 
the subjectivity of estimation results, and 
c) The SFA is only well developed for single output or single input 
technologies. Hence, if an organization uses multiple inputs and produces 
multiple outputs, either inputs or outputs will have to be aggregated into a 
single measure. Since aggregation is only possible when relative prices or 
weights are known if prices cannot be defined, the use of SFA becomes 
extremely difficult. 
3.3.4 DETERMINISTIC APPROACH 
 
The deterministic approach can be measured using free disposable hull (FDH), corrected 
ordinary least squares (COLS) and data envelopment analysis (DEA).  FDH and DEA are 
non parametric methods because there is no specific functional form that is imposed on 
the data and COLS is defined using a specified functional form (Tandon, 2005). In this 
research, literature on the above mentioned methods will be analyzed so that the best 
method will be used when analyzing the data. 
 
 
52 
 
3.3.4.1 FREE DISPOSAL HULL (FDH) 
 
This is a non-parametric production frontier technique that is used to estimate the extent 
of slack in government expenditures (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003, p. 242). The 
FDH analysis was first proposed by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens in 1984. In the FDH 
framework, the efficiency of the producers is ranked by comparing each individual 
performance with a production possibility frontier. Along this production frontier one can 
observe the highest possible level of outcome or output for a given level of input. 
Furthermore, through the FDH, it is possible to determine the lowest level of inputs 
necessary to attain a given level of output or outcome. Through this process, FDH helps 
in the identification of inefficient producers, both in terms of input efficiency and output 
efficiency (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003, p. 242).  
 
The FDH analysis was used to assess the public sector performance and the efficiency of 
twenty three industrialized countries by Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi in their paper 
titled, “Public sector efficiency: an international comparison” (Afonso, Schuknecht and 
Tanzi 2003, p. 242). In measuring this efficiency, they used opportunity indicators that 
took into account administrative, education and health outcomes, and the quality of 
infrastructure. The other indicators that they used are the standard Musgravian roles of 
government, that is, allocation, distribution and stabilization. Afonso and the other 
researchers measured the efficiency of these twenty three industrialized countries by 
looking at the total spending and the number of spending categories as proxies for 
resource use (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003, p. 242). Out of these twenty three 
countries, four are on the production possibility frontier and the rest are inside the frontier 
and this means that these countries are inefficient. 
 
Afonso and Aubyn (2005, p. 227) also used the FDH analysis to measure the efficiency 
of the health and education sectors in OECD countries in their article titled, “Non 
parametric approaches to education and health efficiency in OECD countries’. In this 
research, Afonso and Aubyn chose to measure the efficiency of the education and health 
sectors in OECD countries because these are areas where public expenditure is of great 
importance. Therefore, the results have strong implications in what concerns public 
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sector efficiency. This is so because, spending in education and health accounted for ten 
and fifteen percent of GDP respectively in 2000 in some of the European Countries 
(Afonso and Aubyn 2005, p. 227). They compared the resources that were used to 
provide certain services, that is, the inputs and outputs. Their aim was to identify 
efficiency frontiers and therefore detect inefficient situations. In this study, the efficiency 
frontier was estimated using the quantity inputs because a country can appear to be 
technically efficient but can also appear to be inefficient if the inputs used are expensive 
(Afonso and Aubyn 2005, p. 227). The FDH analysis can be explained through the use of 
the diagram below: 
 
Figure 3-4: FDH and DEA Compared  
 (Afonso and Aubyn 2005, p. 227) 
Figure 3.4 above, measures the efficiency of four countries. According to the FDH 
analysis country D is inefficient. This is because when country D is compared to C, the 
latter is using fewer resources to produce more output and country D is using more 
resources to produce fewer outputs; [C {X (D) >X(C), [Y(D) <Y(C)]] . Countries A, B 
and C are efficient because there are no countries that provide evidence that they could 
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improve their output without increasing the resources that they already have. Countries A 
and B are referred to as independently efficient while country C is not independently 
efficient (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003, p. 242). The input efficiency score of a 
country indicates how much less inputs they can use to achieve the same level of output. 
Furthermore, the output efficiency score can tell how much more output a country can 
produce with the same amount of resources. This can be further explained by the example 
below: 
 
 Figure 3-5: Production Possibility Frontier 
Y, Index of Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   X (A) =100             X (B) = 150                             X, Spending 
(Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003, p. 242) 
 
From the above figure, the input efficiency is  , equal to 0.5 which is less than one, 
since B is the interior of the production possibility frontier. This implies that the excess 
use of inputs by inefficient country B is fifty percent of the necessary inputs to achieve 
the same level of performance of country A. Country B’s output efficiency score is  . 
Y (A) =10 
Y (B) =5 
A 
B
D 
C 
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In this example, the loss of output of country B relative to the most efficient country turns 
out to be also fifty percent. For Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003, p. 242). The 
production possibility frontier for the example in figure 3.5 is as follows:    
    
0, 100
10,100 ( )( ) ( ), ( ) ( )
( ), ( )
X
X X C
Y f x
Y C X C X X D
Y D X X D
<
 ≤ <
= = ≤ <
 ≥
 Equation 3-1  
     
The FDH method allows the calculation of the production possibility frontier, input and 
output efficiency scores which will help in the ranking of several countries according to 
their public spending efficiency. These efficiency scores are usually set between 0 and 1, 
and all the countries placed on the production possibility frontier are assigned the 
maximum score of efficiency which is 1 (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003, p. 242). 
This means that, all points on the frontier are fully efficient and those that are below the 
frontier are technically inefficient, with the vertical distance from the frontier measuring 
the degree of output inefficiency (Tandon, 2005). The problem with this approach is that 
it usually underestimates inefficiencies as the countries on the production possibility 
frontier are efficient by definition.  
3.3.4.2 CORRECTED ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
 
This is a deterministic method that uses a parametric regression to fit the data and then 
moves the regression line up by the largest positive residual to ensure that all the data lie 
below the COLS frontier (Tandon, 2005). The use of COLS as a method of measuring 
efficiency scores was introduced by Greene in 1980. When using COLS, the alleged 
relative efficiency of an organization requires the specification of the cost function 
because COLS starts with a regression. This regression is estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and then shifted to create an efficient frontier. With COLS only one 
organization is considered to be efficient. It is this efficient organization that acts as a 
benchmark upon which the relative efficiency of the other organizations will be 
measured.  
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In parametric frontier estimation, the production process of single product is usually 
modelled as follows: 
( , )k kY X β= ƒ  
Equation 3-2 
 
Where Y is output, X is a set of inputs.  Is a set of parameters which are going to be 
estimated, and k refers to the producers (Chabaan, 2004).  
 
The production frontier in equation 3.2 can be written in a log-linear form as follows: 
ln 'k k k kQ Y Xα β ε= = + +  
Equation 3-3 
 
According to Chaaban (2004), the specifications in equation 3.3 encompasses the 
translog, generalized Leontieff and Cobb-Douglas functional forms which are all linear in 
the parameters. The error term 	
  represents inefficiency, which is assumed to enter the 
production model additively after taking logarithms. This  	
  is assumed to be a random 
variable with a constant mean. 
k k kv uε = −  
Equation 3-4 
 

 - Random or statistical noise 

  - Technical efficiency 
Since COLS is a parametric deterministic approach, the error term 
  is equal to zero. 
This means that COLS like any other deterministic approach to data analysis does not 
take into consideration other measurement errors. In fact, any deviations from the 
estimated frontier are attributed to inefficiencies (Greene, 2007).  
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Chabaan (2004) shows that the constant term can be consistently estimated simply by 
shifting the least squares line upward so that the largest residual is zero. The corrected 
constant term is usually written as: 
( )kcols cols max eα α
∧ ∧
= +  
  Equation 3-5 
 
Therefore the individual efficiency measure can be written as:  
( )k k k kcols cols max eε ε
∧ ∧
= +  
Equation 3-6 
 
Equation 3.6 can be written in terms of a technical efficiency (TE) as: 
exp ( )k
k
colsTE ε
∧
= −  
Equation 3-7 
 
Ruggiero (1998, p. 369) defines technical efficiency (TE) as a feasible input/output 
vector where it is technologically impossible to increase any output or reduce any input 
without simultaneously reducing another output or increasing any other input. If an 
organization has a TE score equal to 1, it is efficient. For example, if an organization has 
a TE score of 1.3 it means that it needs to expand its output by Ln (1.3) which is equal to 
twenty six percent for it to be efficient. The reason why COLS will not be used to 
measure efficiency is that it does not bind the data as closely as possible. This is because 
the frontier is restricted to be a shift up of the estimated OLS production function. 
Moreover, the above disadvantage can unnecessarily penalize the efficiency estimates of 
countries with relatively low OLS residuals. Moreover, it can especially be problematic if 
there is heteroscedasticity in the sample. Furthermore, COLS remains an inherently 
deterministic approach. This means technical inefficiency estimates cannot be 
disentangled from random errors. 
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3.3.4.3 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS (DEA) 
DEA is a non parametric method meaning that estimates are not based on any statistical 
distribution and noise is explicitly considered in the estimation.  Additionally, as a non 
parametric method it means that no assumptions will be made on the functional 
relationship between the inputs and outputs, any statistical distribution and no parameters 
will be estimated based on assumed statistical distributions. The DEA technique can be 
used to estimate the efficient levels of both inputs and outputs from either an input and 
output orientation that allows both input and output levels to simultaneously change. 
DEA involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a non parametric 
piece-wise surface or frontier over the data. According to Fare, Grosskopf and Squires 
(2007) the piece-wise linear convex hull approach to frontier estimation was first 
proposed by Farrell in 1957 as a multiple input, single output measure of efficiency. The 
DEA model received wide attention after a paper by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
In Fare, Grosskopf and Squires (2007) extended Farrell’s model to a multiple output, 
multiple input technology. In DEA all the points on the frontier have maximum 
efficiency and inefficiency is calculated by estimating the vertical distance of each point 
from the DEA frontier (Tandon, 2005). 
There are many ways of measuring efficiency of the sub-national government. Among 
them, DEA seems to be friendlier in that, the stochastic frontier method requires 
technically complex assumptions regarding distributions and error mixtures. Moreover, 
the theoretical assumptions of efficiency measurement which are formulated in the 
stochastic method are unlikely to hold true in the social sector.  
 
The Deterministic Approach (DA) as a method of measuring efficiency seems to be more 
transparent but leaves no room for measurement errors. Moreover, the DEA as an 
analytical tool can assist in the identification of best practices in the use of resources 
among a group of organizations. Such identification can highlight possible efficiency 
improvements that may help agencies, in this case the provincial government, to achieve 
their objectives. 
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According to the Commonwealth Steering Committee, 2006 the main advantages of DEA 
are that: 
a. It can readily incorporate multiple inputs and outputs and, to calculate technical 
efficiency, only requires information on output and input quantities (not prices). 
This makes it particularly suitable for analyzing the efficiency of government 
service providers, especially those providing social services where it is difficult or 
impossible to assign prices to the outputs; 
b. Possible sources of inefficiency can be determined as well as efficiency levels. It 
provides a means of ‘decomposing’ economic inefficiency into technical and 
allocative inefficiency. Furthermore, it also allows technical inefficiency to be 
decomposed into scale effects, the effects of unwanted inputs which the agency 
cannot dispose of, and a residual component; 
c. By identifying the ‘peers’ for organizations which are not observed to be efficient, 
it provides a set of potential role models that an organization can look to, in the 
first instance, for ways of improving its operations. This makes DEA a potentially 
useful tool for benchmarking and changing implementation programs. This role is 
strengthened by DEA’s ability to incorporate differences in operating 
environments beyond management control and thus, to make more like-with-like 
comparisons. 
d. Moreover, the arbitrary selection of the frontier functional form and error 
distribution is not required in DEA. 
3.3.5 DEA APPLICATIONS 
 
Jimenez and Smith (1994) carried out research on the quality of primary health care using 
the DEA model. These researchers held that the quality of primary care should ultimately 
be judged on the effect of the health outcome of individual patients. Therefore, this article 
used DEA to measure the quality of primary health care administration. The driving 
assumption was that, it offers a consistent and helpful intermediate technology for 
assessing performance. The outputs for primary health care are not tangible and unfold 
over a long period of time. Therefore, by looking at the variables that were going to be 
used to judge the quality of primary health care, DEA was the best suited model.  
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Their main aim was to explore the extent to which DEA gives useful insights into the 
performance of the Family Health Service Authorities in the United Kingdom as well as 
to assess the usefulness of DEA in the primary health care. For this reason, they used 
seven indicators from the output side and three from the input side. The DEA model that 
was used by Jimenez and Smith (1994) was formulated as follows: 
Let   (i =1….m) be the m input used and   (r =1….s) the s outputs produced by the 
DMU j (j =1….n). The technical efficiency of the DMU 0 was then assessed as:  
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 Equation 3-8 
 
The purpose of the above formulated DEA model was to find a set of the output weights 
 and input weights  for the quality of the primary health care, which maximizes its 
efficiency.  
 
Evans, Tandon, Murray and Lauer (2001, p. 307) in their research titled, “The 
comparative efficiency of national health systems in producing health: An analysis of one 
hundred and ninety one (191), countries” used DEA. In this research, efficiency was 
referred to as system performance because health expenditure is taken as the indicator of 
input to the health sector and health as output (Evans, Tandon, Murray and Lauer 2001, 
p. 307). Therefore, efficiency in this article reflects not only whether health programmes 
and interventions are produced at the lowest possible cost, that is, technical efficiency, 
but also whether the health system chooses to provide the most cost effective set of 
programmes for the given level of expenditure, and this is referred to as allocative 
efficiency.  
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Evans, Tandon, Murray and Lauer (2001, p. 307), among other methods that can be used 
to measure efficiency, also used the DEA model. This model was conceptualized in terms 
of the following linear program: 
    
    
 
 
 
                        
1
1 1, 1, , 0
i
i
U Y
subject to j and u v
V X
 
= ≤ = ≥ 
   
Equation 3-9 
 
 Refers to inputs and  outputs and u and v are scalar values chosen for each 
production unit such that the efficiencies of each unit are maximized and no efficiencies 
are greater than one. In view of the fact that the above model used by Evans, Tandon, 
Murray and Lauer (2001, p. 307) has an infinite number of solutions, an additional 
constraint was therefore needed. The model was thus rewritten as follows: 
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Equation 3-10 
 
The above model was used to plot a DEA frontier, and a few countries were on the 
frontier. This indicated that they were not efficient in their goals of providing health 
services to their citizens.   
 
In the article titled, “Non parametric approaches to education and health efficiency in 
OECD countries”, Afonso and Aubyn (2005, p. 227) used the DEA model. Furthermore, 
they suggested that the quantities of services and goods that are provided by the public 
1
, 1max
i
u v
i
U Y
V X
 
= 
 
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and private sectors have a direct impact on welfare and is vital for the prospects of 
economic growth. In order to ensure that the results were hundred percent correct, they 
used two methods, that is, DEA and FDH which are both deterministic approaches.  
 
Afonso and Aubyn (2005, p. 227) from figure 3.4 above, they compared FDH and DEA. 
Under FDH, countries A, B and C are efficient. In contrast, under DEA only countries A 
and C are efficient while country B is deemed inefficient. This is due to the convexity 
restrictions imposed when applying DEA. This shows that DEA is more inflexible than 
FDH, meaning that a country that is efficient under FDH is not always efficient under 
DEA. A country efficient under DEA can be efficient under FDH (Afonso, Schuknecht 
and Tanzi 2003, p. 242). This generally means that input or output efficiency scores are 
usually smaller with DEA. A practical example is the OECD countries that were 
considered to be efficient under FDH: Denmark, France and Norway. Contrarily, they 
were found to be inefficient under DEA. According to Afonso and Aubyn (2005, p. 227), 
two out of the three countries that were inefficient under DEA were efficient by default 
under the FDH analysis.  
 
For Afonso and Aubyn (2005, p. 227) higher performance is directly linked with higher 
input levels. In this case the education efficiency was based on the number of teachers per 
student only and the model was written as: 
 
1
100studentsTPS
teachers
−
 
= ∗ 
 
 
Equation 3-11  
 
For education efficiency, the underlying assumption was “more is better”, that is an 
increase in the number of teachers means there will be an increase in the output, which is 
the number of students that have passed. On the other hand, health efficiency was 
measured by looking at the infant survival rate as well as their life expectancy. Therefore, 
their model was specified as follows: 
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− 
=  
 
  
Equation 3-12 
 
ISR refers to the Infant survival rate and IMR refers to the infant mortality rate. For 
health efficiency, the underlying assumption is that, the lower the rate of infant mortality, 
the more efficient the health sector is. 
 
This research consisted of seventeen countries. In such circumstances, it is advisable to 
note that situations in which countries’ resources are comparatively expensive could be 
wrongly considered as not efficient while where countries’ resources are considered 
comparatively cheaper would appear as efficient in financial terms.  
 
Ray (1991, p. 1620) carried out research on the efficiency of resource use in public 
schools in 122 districts of Connecticut. This research was carried out over a period of two 
years from 1980 to 1981. This research used DEA combined with regression modelling to 
estimate relative efficiency in the public schools districts of Connecticut. The efficiency 
of these schools was to be measured from the maximum level of student achievements 
produced from a given bundle of resources used (Ray 1991, p. 1620). A high 
achievement school can be said to be effective but inefficient if it is using more school 
inputs than is necessary to produce that level of achievement.  
 
On the other hand, a relatively poor school may be making the best use of its resources 
and thus considered to be efficient, but still proves to be ineffective because achievement 
levels fall short of what is deemed to be acceptable. As a result, through DEA findings, 
Ray (1991, p. 1620) suggested that productivity of schools input varies considerably 
across districts. This was mainly due to the differences in the socio-economic 
backgrounds of the communities served. For example, if a community is wealthy in 
resources it means that they will use as much as they can for school inputs as compared 
to those communities that do not have enough resources. 
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According to Ray (1991, p. 1620) each school or district was viewed as a multi product 
firm, the DEA model was formulated as: Let qt = (q1t, q2t… qmt) and xt = (xit, x2t... xnt) to 
represent the output and input bundles of DMU t (t = 1, 2... N). Therefore the productive 
efficiency of DMU t can be obtained as the optimal solution of the conceptual model: 
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Equation 3-13 
 
The weights Vrt and Uit are virtual prices to be used to aggregate the outputs and inputs of 
DMU t. in the above model, ht is a measure of factor productivity and by construction 
this measure of efficiency cannot exceed 1.  
 
Another research that used DEA because of its capability to determine the relative 
relationships among different organizations is the research by Ehreth (1994). This 
research looked at the development and evaluation of hospital performance measures for 
policy analysis. Ehreth (1994) used the DEA to determine the efficient frontier for a set 
of hospitals. Conceptually, the efficient production frontier allows DMUs to be relatively 
efficient even though they might have different mixes of inputs and outputs. Ehreth 
(1994) modelled a general DEA ratio, Dk to use for measuring the performance of 
hospitals. This model can be expressed as follows: 
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Equation 3-14 
 
Where Yjk is the jth output from the kth hospital  
Xik is the ith input used by the kth hospital, and u and v are weights generated from the 
model such that the hospital is as efficient as possible.  
 
The model by Ehreth (1994) was based on two important assumptions: 
a. All points along the efficient frontier, which is convex by definition, are 
practically attainable production possibilities. This seemed reasonable because  
actual hospital inputs were the ones which were used to create the frontier, and 
b. That there are constant returns to scale or linearity.  
 
This meant that the hospital characteristics had been addressed in two ways, regression or 
peer grouping. Regression was used to adjust either the inputs or outputs prior to 
performing DEA in order to come up with an efficiency frontier that is theoretically 
closer to perfect efficiency. On the other hand, peer grouping the hospitals by 
characteristics such as location helped in the reduction of the number of constraints and 
therefore increases or keeps constant the relative efficiency of all DMUs compared to the 
regression approach. Due to the grouping of the different hospital characteristics the DEA 
values may indicate that some of the hospitals are more efficient than they would be 
when the regression approach was used.  
3.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Decentralisation deals with the problems that are associated with the allocation of 
resources to different regions of a country. Hence, it allows the sub-national government 
to take responsibility for governance and to be more accountable to the people under their 
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jurisdictions. According to the reviewed literature above, decentralisation in most 
developing countries is yet to yield positive results. This is so because, their sub-national 
governments lack the skills needed to raise their own revenue for it to be able to provide 
public goods and services to the people in an efficient manner.   
 
Much work seems to have been done in the measuring of efficiency for the education and 
the health sector. Moreover, the researches under review were carried out as a 
comparison of different countries. For instance, one research by Afonso and Aubyn 
(2005, p. 227) used the DEA model to measure efficiency in OECD countries. Some of 
the researches that have been done were conducted over a maximum period of two years. 
This research is going to contribute to the existing research because it is going to use the 
DEA model to measure the efficiency in the provision of housing and social welfare, 
education and health sectors. In addition, this research is going to look at one DMU but 
four different departments in the Eastern Cape Province. The DEA model is going to be 
used to calculate the efficiency of the ECPG in the provision of social services vis-à-vis 
other provinces for the fiscal years 2002 and 2005.  The next chapter will look at the 
methodology that was used to measure the efficiency of the education, health, social 
welfare and the housing departments in the provision of social services.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the main advantages of decentralization is that smaller governmental units 
become more responsive to consumer demand and tend to be more accountable. 
Decentralization bears an additional cost in the provision of goods and services. Hence, 
this research is going to investigate the efficiency of a fiscally decentralized government 
in South Africa, the ECPG, in the provision of social services to citizens using the DEA 
model. If there is evidence that the ECPG is inefficient as compared to other provinces, 
this research will come up with the reasons why the ECPG is failing to efficiently provide 
these social services to the people in its jurisdiction. Therefore, this chapter will specify 
and explain the research methodology that was employed to collect the data and the 
model used to analyse the data. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the problems that 
were encountered while compiling and analysing the data. 
4.2 RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
 There are two types of research paradigms. These are qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The qualitative research method refers to the collection, analyzing, and 
interpretation of data by observing what people do and say (Geocities, 2007). On the 
other hand, the quantitative research method is a formal, objective, systematic process in 
which numerical data is utilised to obtain information about the world (John, 2008). This 
research is going to use the quantitative research method because it is said by John (2008) 
that, in gaining, analysing and interpreting data, one can remain detached and objective. 
Often this is not possible with qualitative research where one will be supposed to actually 
be involved in the situation of the research. 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Secondary data was used to investigate the efficiency of the ECPG as well as efficiency 
of all the other provinces in the provision of social services to the people in its 
jurisdiction. According to Creswell (1998), secondary data is the analysis of data or 
information that was either gathered by someone, or for some other purpose other than 
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the reason which the data will be used in the current research. Secondary data was used 
because it provided a cost-effective way of gaining in-depth understanding of social 
service provision in the Eastern Cape Province.  
4.4 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SECONDARY DATA 
4.4.1 ADVANTAGES OF USING SECONDARY DATA 
 
i. Secondary data collection and analysis is the quickest way of gathering data as 
compared to primary data gathering and analysis. 
ii. If the available secondary data is reliable, researchers save time and money by 
making good use of the available data rather than collecting primary data, thus 
avoiding duplication of effort. 
iii. Using secondary data provides a relatively low-cost means of comparing the level of 
well-being of different political units, for example, national, provincial and local 
governmental bodies. In this case, this research project is going to use the secondary 
data to measure the efficiency of the ECPG in the provision of social services to the 
population of the Eastern Cape. 
iv. Depending on the level of data disaggregation, secondary data analysis lends itself to 
trend analysis as it offers a relatively easy way to monitor change over time and 
v. Secondary data analysis enables one to have a bigger and a more representative 
sample as compared to the smaller sample that might have been collected as data. 
4.4.2 DISADVANTAGES OF USING SECONDARY DATA 
 
i. Secondary data helps us understand the condition or status of a group, but compared 
to primary data they are imperfect reflections of reality. Without proper interpretation 
and analysis the data does not help us understand why something is happening, 
ii. The person reviewing the secondary data should have the ability to select the data 
which is only relevant to his or her research project,  
iii. It is often difficult to determine the quality of some of the data in question. 
iv. Sources may conflict with each other, 
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v. Because secondary data is usually not collected for the same purpose that the original 
had been collected for, the goals and purposes of the original data gathered can 
potentially bias the study, 
vi. The data was collected by other researchers, and they are the ones who decided what 
to collect and what to omit, therefore, all of the information needed by the current 
investigator using the secondary data may not be available or biased. 
4.5 MEASURING EFFICIENCY USING DEA AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Efficiency measures the degree to which outputs are achieved in terms of productivity 
and the resources allocated. In the context of this research project, efficiency was used to 
measure the extent to which the provincial governments in South Africa are able to use 
the minimum resources that are allocated to them to provide social services to the people 
in their jurisdictions. When looking at resources, this research project was referring to the 
revenue that was allocated to these provincial governments by the national government as 
well as the revenue that they were able to raise on their own.  
 
The secondary data used is annual data from provided by the National Treasury. This 
efficiency was measured over a period of two years, that is, 2002 and 2005 for all the 
departments because the data was easily accessible for all the provinces. This means that 
window analysis was used which assesses the performance of organizations by treating 
them as different entities in each time period. In addition, the data on the revenue and 
expenditure of the provincial governments will be for four departments, that is, the 
education, health, housing and social welfare, for each fiscal year. 
4.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The data collected for measuring efficiency will be analysed using Data Envelopment 
Analysis. This is a quantitative method used to analyse the production function and 
certain concepts of efficiency. DEA is a non parametric method in operations research 
and economics for the estimation of production frontiers (Hughes and Edwards, 2000). 
DEA was developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. They described it as 
mathematical programming model applied to observational data to be used for estimating 
70 
 
the level of efficiency in production (Hughes and Edwards, 2000). For Hughes and 
Edwards (2000), the DEA can be introduced as a “methodology directed to frontiers 
rather than central tendencies. Instead of trying to fit a regression plane through the 
centre of the data, one ‘floats’ a piece-wise linear surface to rest on top of the 
observations. Because of this unique perspective, DEA proves particularly adept at 
uncovering relationships that remain hidden for other methodologies”.  
 
There are various types of DEA models which may be used depending upon conditions at 
hand. For example, if it is assumed that economies of scale do not change as size of the 
service facility increases, then a constant returns to scale type DEA model is an 
appropriate choice (versus the variable returns to scale DEA model). Furthermore, if 
managers` priorities are to adjust their inputs (before outputs) then an input-oriented DEA 
model rather than an output-oriented model is appropriate. There are two basic empirical 
models of DEA. These are, the constant returns to scale (CRS) model also known as the 
CRS 7 model and the variable returns to scale (VRS) also known as the BCC8 model.  
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes constructed constant returns to scale frontier by identifying 
a DMU which maximizes the ratio of output to input (Hughes and Edwards, 2000). This 
ratio can be interpreted as the maximum average productivity. It denotes the scale 
efficient branch since it is consistent with a position of constant returns to scale. The 
constant returns to scale assumptions are only appropriate when all DMUs are operating 
at an optimal scale.  
 
Productive efficiency is achieved when the departments under review operate on the 
frontier of the production technology at a scale of operation characterized by constant 
returns to scale. When these departments operate under increasing returns to scale it 
means that an inefficient small output vector is being produced, whereas decreasing 
returns to scale means that an inefficient large output vector is being produced. Thus the 
inefficiency associated with VRS (non-constant returns to scale) is captured by a measure 
of scale efficiency (Coelli, 1996). 
                                                 
7
 After Charnes , Cooper and Rhodes 
8
 After Banker , Charnes and Cooper 
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The primary difference between BCC model and the CRS model is the treatment of 
returns to scale. The CRS version bases the evaluation on constant returns to scale. 
Moreover, the BCC version is more flexible and allows variable returns to scale. The 
CRS model assumes that the DMU`s are operating at an optimal scale. By running the 
DEAP 2.1 version of the computer program developed by Coelli (1996), the BCC 
efficiency scores are obtained. These scores are called “pure technical efficiency scores 
(PECH)” since they are obtained from the model that allows variable returns to scale and 
hence eliminates the “scale part” of the efficiency from the analysis. That is, for the 
ECPG departments to be considered as CRS efficient they must be both scale and 
technical efficient. However, for it to be efficient according to the BCC efficiency scale, 
it only needs to be technically efficient. The VRS model provides technical efficiency 
scores which are greater than or equal to those obtained using the CRS model. 
4.7 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE DEA 
 
According to Emrouznejad (2007), Efficiency is generally measured as: 
 
OutputEfficiency
Input
 
=  
 
                                        
        Equation 4-1     
The above equation was modified because this research is using data which is made up of 
multiple inputs and outputs. Hence, equation 4.1 can be rewritten as (Emrouznejad, 
2007): 
 
weighted sum of outputsEfficiency
weighted sum of inputs
 
=  
 
                       
  Equation 4-2     
 
According to Coelli (1996), the mathematical formulation for the Input-Oriented VRS 
DEA Model, starting with the CRS Model, is as follows:  
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Equation 4.3 was used to select the optimal weights. The problem with this equation is 
that it has an infinite number of solutions, hence, to avoid this constraint ' iv x = 1 was 
imposed, giving us: 
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Equation 4-4 
 
The notation change in u and v to µ and ν transforms equation 4.4 to a form known as 
the multiplier.  
 
An equivalent envelopment form for calculating CRS was obtained using the duality 
linear programming formulated as:  
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Equation 4-5 
 
 θ  Is a scalar and λ is an N x 1 vector of constants. This envelopment form is more 
preferable than the equation 4.4 because it has got fewer constraints9. This is a form of 
                                                 
9
 It should be noted that equations 4.5 is the one that was used to calculate the efficiency scores.  
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the linear programming problem that was run for the education, health, social welfare and 
the housing departments to obtain the efficiency scores. 
 
To check whether a DMU with an efficiency score 1 is indeed fully efficient, the DEA 
model includes the calculation of input and output slacks. Therefore equation 4.5 was 
defined as follows:  
 
  
   
Equation 4-6 
 
OS is an M x 1 vector of output slacks, IS is a K x 1 vector of input slacks and M1 and 
K1 are M x 1 and K x 1 vectors of ones, respectively. This second stage linear program 
was also run for all the DMUs under study. As the results are going to show, Multi-stage 
DEA was used. This is because it identifies efficient projected points which have input 
and output mixes which are as similar as possible to those of the inefficient points 
(Coelli, 1996). 
 
The CRS linear programming problem, Equation 4.5, was modified to account for VRS 
by adding the convexity constraint: N1 'λ = 1 to provide: 
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N1 is an N x 1 vector of ones. This forms a convex hull which envelope the data more 
tightly than the CRS hull, thus the technical efficiency scores of VRS will be greater or 
equal to the technical efficiency scores from the CRS model.  
 
Technical efficiency scores from a CRS DEA can be due to scale inefficiency or “pure” 
technical inefficiency. Therefore, if there is a difference between the CRS and VRS 
efficiency scores it indicates that the DMU is scale inefficiency (Coelli, 1996). Scale 
inefficiency is the ratio of the CRSTE to the VRSTE. 
 
This DEA model also calculated the economies of scale at which the education, health, 
social welfare and the housing departments were operating at. This was done by 
substituting N1 'λ = 1 in equation 4.7 by N1 'λ ≤  1, to come up with the following 
formulation:  
,
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Equation 4-8 
 
From the results in the next chapter, the nature of the scale inefficiencies is due to 
decreasing or constant returns to scale. 
 
It should be noted that for this research purposes, efficiency was rated as follows: 
 
i. If efficiency is equal to one, then the ECPG departments were efficient in the 
provision of social services to the people in its jurisdiction,  
ii. If efficiency is between 0 and 1, the ECPG departments will be said to be 
inefficient in the provision of social services. 
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4.8 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The empirical model to be adopted in this study will incorporate the Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (BCC model) and Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR model). This research used 
the Input-Oriented VRS DEA Model. The results from the model were obtained after 
running the DEAP computer program. 
 
The DEAP program is written in FORTRAN (Lahey F77LEM/32). This program 
involves a simple batch file system where the user creates a data file and a small file 
containing instructions. These instructions once executed produces an output file which 
can be read using a text editor, such as NOTEPAD or EDIT, or using a word processor, 
such as WORD (Coelli, 1996). According to Coelli the execution of DEAP Version 2.1 
generally involves five files: 
 
a. The executable DEAP. EXE file 
b. The start up file DEAP. 000 
c. A data file (for example, Edu2. DTA) 
d. An instruction file (for example, Edu2. INS) 
e. An output file (for example, Edu2. OUT) 
 
Below is an example of the instruction file that was run in DEAP. EXE in order to obtain 
the efficiency results:  
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Table 4-1: DEAP.EXE Instruction File 
Ed2-dta.txt            Data file name 
Ed2-out.txt            Output file name 
9   Number of firms 
1  Number of time periods 
3 Number of outputs 
1 Number of inputs 
0     0=Input and 1=Output Orientated 
1     0=crs and 1=vrs 
0 0=DEA (Multistage), 1=Cost-DEA, 2=Malmquist-DEA, 3=DEA Stage)  
4=DEA (2-Stage) 
 
For all the four departments, data for the years 2002 and 2005 was run. On the number of 
outputs, all the other departments have three, but the health department has got two 
outputs. This is because for all the provinces there were discrepancies in the output data 
of the health sector in South Africa. 
4.9 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
The variables that are used in this research have been chosen to reflect important 
characteristics of the provincial governments in South Africa which are responsible for 
the provision of social services to the people. The definitions of variables used are 
contained in the table below: 
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Table 4-2: Description of the variables 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
INPUT This is the amount of money that is given to the education, 
health, social welfare and the housing departments in order to 
improve the lives of the people of South Africa. This revenue 
comes from different sources such as: Transfers from the 
National Government in the form of equitable share and 
conditional grants. The provincial governments raise their own 
revenue from taxes collected in the form of casino taxes, motor 
vehicle licences, horseracing, and other taxes. 
 
OUTPUT Out of the revenue that is made available to them, this is the 
amount that the four departments that are responsible for the 
provision of social services are able to spend in their respective 
provinces. In most cases, these departments usually over spend 
or under spend their revenue.  
 
The efficiency of the four departments was also, measured by 
looking at the types of services that they provide as output. 
These are shown in the table 4.2 below;  
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Table 4-3: Proxies used to measure efficiency  
Education Explanation of proxies 
Input  This is revenue which is a % of the Provincial Government 
allocated to the  education department 
Output 1 % of the budget spent by the education department 
Output 2  % of learners who wrote their matric successfully 
Output 3 Learner: Educator ratio   
Health Explanation of proxies 
Input  This is revenue which is a % of the Provincial Government 
allocated to the  health department 
Output 1 % of the budget spent by the health department 
Output 2 Number of healthcare personnel per 1000 population 
Social Development Explanation of proxies 
Input  This is revenue which is a % of the Provincial Government 
allocated to the  social welfare department 
Output 1 % of the budget spent by the Social Development department 
Output 2 Number of people who receive social grants as a % of the 
population 
Output 3 Number of pay points as a ratio of those who receive social 
grants 
Housing Explanation of proxies 
Input  This is revenue which is a % of the Provincial Government 
allocated to the  housing department 
Output 1 % of the budget spent by the housing department 
Output 2 Number of people staying in informal houses as a % of the total 
population 
Output 3 Number of completed houses as a ratio of those who stay in 
Informal Houses 
 (Statssa, 2007) 
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The concept of efficiency used in this work is that of technical efficiency and the model 
for empirical measurement is the input-oriented and variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA. 
The assumption of the CRS DEA model is suitable for situations where all the 
departments are operating at the most favourable scale. This assumption is not realistic 
for most public institutions. For this reason it could not be adopted in this study. The 
input-orientation approach was used because in most cases governmental departments 
responsible for the provision of social services do not control their output level but 
merely respond to the demands from people in their province.  
4.10 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
 
One challenge experienced with the data was that revenue was given but there was no 
breakdown of what was allocated to the various provinces. Therefore, this was calculated 
using the criteria illustrated in table 4.4 below:  
 
Table 4-4: Interprovincial distribution of National Revenue 
SECTOR % FOR 2002 - 2005 
EDUCATION 41 
HEALTH 19 
SOCIAL WELFARE 18 
HOUSING 17 
 (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2007) 
4.11 CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATIONS OF DEA 
 
The application of the DEA approach requires a set of conditions for the effective, 
interpretation, use and acceptance of the results of the DEA. The following guidelines 
and conditions are useful when applying the DEA. 
a) Positivity Property: The DEA formulation requires that the input and output 
variables be positive (greater than zero).  If the variable is not positive the 
following procedure is performed. A positive amount is added to the negative 
value so that the particular input or output variable becomes positive. This same 
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adjustment must be made to the same input or output value for all decision 
making units included in the data set in order not to alter the efficiency frontier. 
b) Isotonicity Property: It is required that the functions relating inputs to outputs 
have the mathematical property called isotonicity. This means that an increase in 
any input should result in some output increase and not a decrease in any output. 
If it is apparent that the isotonicity property is violated, the isotonicity 
requirement may be accommodated by using reciprocals. 
c) Homogeneity of DMUs: DEA requires a relatively homogeneous set of entities. 
That is, all entities included in the evaluation set should have the same inputs and 
outputs in positive amounts in order to control for case-mix.  
d) Numbers of DMUs: A sufficiently large number of DMUs are needed in order to 
ensure sufficient degrees of freedom for a meaningful analysis.  If a small sample 
is included in the dataset, there is a danger that an excessive number of the DMUs 
will be considered efficient (receive a rating of one) because of an inadequate 
number of degrees of freedom. The discriminating power of DEA is limited when 
a small number of DMUs are considered. 
4.12 CONCLUSION 
This research project is going to use aggregated and disaggregated secondary data to 
measure the efficiency of the ECPG vis-à-vis other provinces in the provision of social 
services to the people in their jurisdictions  The DEA model was used to measure the 
efficiency of these provincial governments. The next chapter on data analysis is going to 
show the efficiency results of the ECPG vis-à-vis other provinces. The input oriented 
VRS DEA model of DEAP version 2.1 was run to estimate the efficiency scores of all the 
provinces in South in Africa in the provision of education, health, social welfare and 
housing services.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results obtained using the DEA Model for the fiscal 
years, 2002 and 2005 for the four departments under consideration. In order to evaluate 
the efficiency of the Eastern Cape Province in comparison with other provinces, data was 
run for all the provinces using the Input Oriented VRS DEA model. The efficiency of 
these departments was reviewed because of the vital role that they play towards the 
eradication of poverty in South Africa. The presentation of the results was guided by the 
methodological framework that was developed in the previous chapter (chapter 4). The 
computation of efficiency scores was undertaken using a computer program, DEAP 
version 2.1, developed by Coelli in 1996. See Appendix 1 for the data that was used to 
calculate the efficiency of the education, health, social welfare and housing departments 
for all the provinces. In measuring efficiency both technical10 efficiency and allocative11 
efficiency will be considered. This is because when these two are combined, they provide 
a measure of economic efficiency.  
5.2 RESULTS FROM THE VRS INPUT ORIENTED DEA MODEL 
 
Constant returns to scale technical efficiency (CRSTE) measure the extent to which an 
increase or a decrease in inputs will be followed by an increase or a decrease in output. 
As is shown in the tabled results below, the results are labeled as decreasing returns to 
scale (DRS), and constant returns to scale (CRS). Decreasing returns to scale (DRS) 
occurs when the output increases by less than proportional change in inputs. Constant 
returns to scale is when an increase in revenue is followed by an increase in expenditure 
by exactly the same proportion. Variable returns to scale technical efficiency (VRSTE), 
measures the extent to which inefficiency being experienced by these provinces on the 
provision of social services is not being caused by their inability to use the revenue that 
has been allocated to it by the national government.  
                                                 
10
 Technical efficiency reflects the ability of a department to obtain maximal output from a given set of 
inputs.  
11
 Allocative efficiency reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions 
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5.2.1 EDUCATION 
 
Table 5-1: Results from the VRS Input - Oriented DEA 
RESULTS FROM DEAP VERSION 2.1 
EDUCATION 2002 
   Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.927 0.957 0.969 drs 
 Free Sate 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
 Gauteng 0.969 0.969 1.000 crs 
 KwaZulu Natal 0.872 0.872 1.000 crs 
Limpopo 0.914 1.000 0.914 drs 
 Mpumalanga 0.934 1.000 0.934 drs 
 Northern Cape 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
 North West 0.965 0.965 1.000 crs 
 Western Cape 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Mean 0.953 0.974 0.980   
EDUCATION 2005 
 Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.914 0.966 0.946 drs 
 Free Sate 0.838 1.000 0.838 drs 
 Gauteng 0.886 0.886 1.000 crs 
 KwaZulu Natal 0.975 1.000 0.975 drs 
Limpopo 0.860 1.000 0.860 drs 
 Mpumalanga 0.491 1.000 0.491 drs 
 Northern Cape 0.906 0.981 0.923 drs 
 North West 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
 Western Cape 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Mean 0.874 0.981 0.893   
 
 
The VRS Input oriented DEA model calculated the aggregated efficiency scores for the 
education departments in all the provinces for the fiscal years 2002 and 2005.  The 
efficiency of these provincial governments was measured using the Input-Oriented VRS 
DEA model. In 2002, under CRSTE the Free State, Northern Cape and the Western Cape 
provinces were efficient in the provision of education as a service. The VRSTE efficiency 
scores suggest that the Free State, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and Western 
Cape are efficient in the provision of educational services.  
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According to the constant returns to scale (CRSTE) results for 2002, Free State, Northern 
Cape and Western Cape provinces have efficient scores equal to 1.000 and for 2005 
North West and Western Cape also have efficient scores equal to 1.000. These results are 
above the overall mean score of 0.953 and 0.874 respectively. This means that they are 
efficient in the provision of educational services and this is illustrated by the CRS DEA 
curve in figures 5.1 and 5.2 below. On the other hand, the Eastern Cape with an 
efficiency score of 0.927 and 0.914, and all the other provinces are below this CRS DEA 
curve which means that they are not efficient since the efficiency scores are below 1.000. 
This means that they are inefficient in the provision of educational services to the people 
in their jurisdictions. These provinces that are inefficient need to improve on their 
revenue usage since according to their data on revenue and expenditure for 2002 and 
2005, they under-spent their revenue. 
In 2005, the North West and the Western Cape provincial governments were the only 
provinces that were efficient in the provision of education as a service under both CRSTE 
and VRSTE. As shown by the VRSTE scores for 2005, the Free State, KwaZulu Natal, 
Limpopo and Mpumalanga were also efficient, but their scale efficiency scores suggest 
otherwise. As shown by the results in table 5.1 the Eastern Cape together with the 
Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and the North West province were inefficient in the provision 
of education in 2002 with VRSTE scores of 0.957, 0.969, and 0.872 and 0.965 
respectively. In 2005 the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces were still operating 
inefficiently with VRSTE scores of 0.966 and 0.886 respectively, as well as the Northern 
Cape which had a VRSTE score of 0.906. The VRSTE scores are summarized in table 
5.1 above and illustrated in figure 5.1 and 5.2 below. These provinces with VRSTE 
scores below 1.000 means that their inefficiency is due to the fact that they are failing to 
utilise the revenue allocated to them. 
A further breakdown of overall technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency enables an investigation of the sources of the inefficiencies of each 
province. By looking at the scale efficiency, the Eastern Cape as compared to other 
provinces is the seventh and fourth most inefficient province in the provision of 
education with a scale efficiency score of 0.969 and 0.946 for 2002 and 2005 
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respectively. This inefficiency in the provision of education by the Eastern Cape 
emanates from inappropriate use of the revenue that is allocated to it by the national 
government which it under-spent. Moreover, in 2002 the Eastern Cape was third from 
last on the number of educators but in 2005 there was an improvement to the province 
with the second largest number of educators in South Africa. Furthermore, in 2002 and 
2005, it was on the fourth position as compared to other provinces in terms of the matric 
pass rate.  
This difference in the CRSTE and VRSTE efficiency results where one province is 
efficient under the CRSTE but not under VRSTE was verified by the calculation of the 
scale efficiency, which is the ratio of CRSTE to the VRSTE. Out of all the provinces that 
are efficient under CRSTE and VRSTE, only the North West and the Western Cape 
provinces can be said to be truly efficient. Scale efficiency investigates potential 
productivity gain from optimal use of the available resources. It is calculated as the 
distance between the CRS DEA frontier and the VRS DEA frontier as shown in table 5.1 
above. 
 
Figure 5-1: CRS and VRS Results: Education 2002 
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Figure 5.1 above shows the DEA frontier for the nine provinces in 2002. All the 
provinces that have CRSTE scores equal to 1.000 are on the CRS frontier and those with 
the VRSTE score equal to 1.000 are on the VRS frontier. All those provinces that are 
below these frontiers are the ones that are inefficient. Also figure 5.2 below shows 
efficiency in the provision of education services for the year 2005: 
 
Figure 5-2: CRS and VRS DEA Results: Education 2005 
 
 
Figure 5.1 and figure 5.2 above summarize the DEA model efficiency results for the 
education department in all the provinces of South Africa. For a full report on the results 
using the VRS input oriented DEA for 2002 and 2005 see Appendix 2. These results are 
sown in table 5.1 above. 
The Input Oriented VRS DEA results reveal that there is a marked deviation of efficiency 
scores from the best practice frontier with the nine provinces having a mean overall 
technical efficiency score of 0.969 and 0.916 for 2002 and 2005 respectively. This means 
that on average, the nine provinces responsible for the provision of social services use 
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more or less revenue than necessary. Moreover, from the overall technical efficiency of 
0.969 and 0.916, the average inputs could be potentially reduced by 0.031 (3.1%) and 
0.084 (8.4 %) without affecting the level of outputs. This inefficiency for those provinces 
that have scale efficiency scores less than 1.000 can be decomposed into scale 
inefficiency, that is, inefficiency due to operations at a non-optimal scale. This means that 
these departments are failing to optimize the revenue allocated to them. There are even 
extreme cases where they use less revenue than what was allocated to them, thus, under-
spending and over-spending when they use more revenue than what was allocated to 
them. It should be noted that efficiency scores range from 0 (totally inefficient) to 1 
(totally efficient). Therefore, the presence of inefficiencies indicates that these four 
departments either under-spent or over-spent their budget.  
5.2.2 Education Budget and Expenditure trends 
 
The Department of Education is required to provide lifelong quality education and 
training opportunities to the people of South Africa. To achieve this, the Education 
Department is expected to provide an efficient education system which properly 
addresses the educational needs of the people (National Treasury, 1996). The Eastern 
Cape Province is one of the historically disadvantaged provinces in South Africa.  
 
Although all provinces under-spent their budget in 2002 and 2005, but provinces like 
Free State, Northern Cape and Western Cape provinces managed to get efficient scores 
equal to 1.000. The scale efficiency results suggest that provinces with a difference in 
CRSTE and VRSTE scores are not truly efficient. This is because most of these 
provinces’ inefficiency is due to lack of educators or proper schooling facilities. This 
under-spending of the budget by the South African Provinces is the main reason why 
there has been little improvement in the provincial educational system even after so many 
years of investment in the system. See appendix 6 for the 2002 and 2005 relationship 
between revenue and expenditure for the nine provinces in South Africa. 
 
The Eastern Cape Province is the second largest province with the third largest 
population yet it is one of the poorest provinces with seventy two percent of its 
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population living in poverty (Statssa, 2007). Therefore, greater access to quality 
education is important to the people of the Eastern Cape because it will help in the 
alleviation of poverty and inequalities as well as the creation of possibilities that will help 
them achieve a better life. This has been made difficult by the department of education in 
the Eastern Cape Province because of its failure to efficiently use the revenue allocated to 
it by the national government in 2002 and 2005 (Statssa, 2007). This is the revenue that it 
could have used to provide the Eastern Cape population with a proper number of schools 
as well as educators. In 2002, there were 381 educators and it was on the seventh position 
as compared to other provinces. For the fiscal year 2005, there was an improvement in 
the number of educators to 842 moving to the fourth position as compared to 2002 
(Statssa, 2007). From the available statistics, the ECPG needs to employ more than 3 000 
teachers every year in order to replace those leaving the profession. The ECPG employs 
at about 1 400 teachers every year. This means it’s not adequately covering the gaps. 
Annually, some teachers resign, retire or even leave the profession for health reasons. 
This lack of teachers leads to increased work load. Whereas the ECPG education rules 
recommend at most forty students per class, in practice there are as many as seventy 
students in one class. Work overload exhausts teachers, and can even cause stress. This 
coupled with poor remuneration, has forced some teachers to leave the profession 
(Statssa, 2007). 
 
The Eastern Cape Province has the lowest matric percentage pass rate as compared to the 
other provinces in South Africa. This low pass rate shows that the Eastern Cape 
Provincial government is not doing much in order to improve the quality of education in 
the province. This low pass rate is mainly due to lack of proper schools in the Eastern 
Cape.  
 
The ECPG has failed to build more public schools in the Eastern Cape. And it has even 
failed to refurbish vandalized schools to make them conducive for a proper learning 
environment for pupils. This would at least help pupils to stay in school. Some schools 
are still built using poles, mud and corrugated iron sheets. 
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In conclusion, the above results as shown by table 5.1 and figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that 
the Eastern Cape together with six other provinces in 2002 and seven other provinces in 
2005 were inefficient in the provision of education to the people in their jurisdictions. As 
shown by the VRSTE results this inefficiency was mainly due to failure by these 
provinces to effectively use the revenue that was allocated to them.  
5.2.3 HEALTH  
 
Table 5-2: Results from the VRS Input - Oriented DEA 
RESULTS FROM DEAP VERSION 2.1 
HEALTH 2002 
 Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.735 0.735 1.000 crs 
 Free Sate 0.862 0.862 1.000 crs 
 Gauteng 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
 KwaZulu Natal 0.921 0.921 1.000 crs 
Limpopo 0.745 0.745 1.000 crs 
 Mpumalanga 0.623 0.623 1.000 crs 
 Northern Cape 0.825 0.825 1.000 crs 
 North West 0.729 0.729 1.000 crs 
 Western Cape 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Mean 0.827 0.827 1.000   
HEALTH 2005 
   Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.792 0.792 1.000 crs 
 Free Sate 0.910 0.910 1.000 crs 
 Gauteng 0.988 1.000 0.988 drs 
 KwaZulu Natal 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Limpopo 0.847 0.847 1.000 crs 
 Mpumalanga 0.756 0.756 1.000 crs 
 Northern Cape 0.920 0.920 1.000 crs 
 North West 0.789 0.789 1.000 crs 
 Western Cape 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Mean 0.889 0.889 0.999   
 
The Input-Oriented VRS DEA results in table 5.2 shows that only two provinces were 
efficient in the provision of healthcare services and the rest were inefficient. This is 
further supported by figure 5.5 and 5.6 below which shows most provinces to be below 
both the CRS and VRS DEA frontiers.   
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Figure 5-3: CRS and VRS Results: Health 2002 
 
 
Figure 5-4: CRS and VRS DEA Results: Health 2005 
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Table 5.2, figure 5.3 and 5.4 summarizes the Input-Oriented VRS DEA efficiency results 
for the health departments in all the provinces of South Africa. For a full report on the 
results using the Input-Oriented VRS DEA model for 2002 and 2005 see Appendix 3. 
These results indicate the average efficiency scores for each province.  
The Input-Oriented VRS DEA results reveal that there is a marked deviation of efficiency 
scores from the best practice because seven provinces have CRSTE efficiency scores that 
are below 1.000. Likewise, the VRSTE efficiency scores for most of the provinces are 
below 1.000 meaning that the inefficiency by these provinces in the provision of 
healthcare services is not only due to over or under expenditure of revenue but also other 
external factors12.  
The constant returns to scale (CRSTE) results for 2002, Gauteng and the Western Cape 
Province are efficient because their efficiency scores are equal to 1.000 and are on the 
CRS DEA frontier as shown by figure 5.3 above. All the other provinces have inefficient 
scores that are below the CRS DEA frontier with the Eastern Cape having an inefficient 
score of 0.735. In 2005, KwaZulu Natal had an efficient score of 1.000 together with the 
Western Cape Province. Similarly, all the other seven provinces’ efficient scores are 
below 1.000 with the Eastern Cape Province having a score 0.792 which is third from 
lowest. Figure 5.4 above summarizes the 2005 VRSTE results for the health sector for all 
the provinces which shows that provinces that have CRSTE efficient scores below 1.000 
lie below the CRS DEA frontier. The low CRSTE scores mean that an increase in 
revenue has not led to an improvement in the provision of healthcare services. 
In 2002 and 2005, Gauteng and the Western Cape provinces had VRSTE scores equal to 
1.000 as well as the KwaZulu Natal province. These provinces that had VRSTE scores 
equal to 1.000 were the ones that made up the VRS DEA frontier, which means that all 
those provinces that have efficient scores below 1.000 lie under the VRS DEA frontier. 
The VRSTE efficient scores are summarized in figure 5.3 and 5.4 above. The VRSTE 
score of 1.000 means that inefficiency in these provinces is due to over or under 
expenditure of revenue. This means that the inefficiency by the Eastern Cape, Free State, 
                                                 
12
 These are factors that indirectly that affect efficiency but are not related to revenue expenditure 
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Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West and Western Cape in 2002 and 2005 can be 
attributed to other external13 factors since VRSTE measures the extent to which 
inefficiency is caused by other factors other than revenue expenditure.  
In 2002 and 2005, all the provinces had scale efficiency scores equal to 1.000 with the 
exception of the Gauteng province in 2005 which had a score of 0.988.  This means that 
inefficiency in these provinces with scale efficiencies equal to 1.000 was not due to the 
failure by these provinces to fully utilise the revenue available to them but due to external 
factors. Be that as it may, these provinces did not manage to fully utilise the revenue that 
was allocated to them by the national government which they either over or under-spent. 
Northern Cape, North West, Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces under-spent their 
revenue both in 2002 and 2005 whilst Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, Western Cape and the 
Free State provinces did over pent in both years (Statssa, 2007). The Eastern Cape under-
spent its revenue in 2002 but in 2005 it over-spent the revenue that was allocated to it.  
The mean overall efficiency score of 0.827 and 0.889 for 2002 and 2005 respectively 
shows that the health departments in South Africa are using less revenue for those that 
under-spent, and for those provinces that over-spent they used more revenue. This means 
that the inputs could be condensed by 0.173 (17.3 %) and 0.111 (11.1 %) for 2002 and 
2005 respectively without affecting the level of outputs. The scale efficiency of 1.000 for 
all the provinces shows that inefficiency in these provinces was not due to operations at a 
non-optimal scale.   
5.2.4 Health Budget and Expenditure trends 
 
The Department of Health is mandated to provide comprehensive public health care 
services to the citizens of South Africa. This responsibility is met through the provision 
of accessible, comprehensive and integrated services that emphasize the importance of 
primary health care (Public Sector Accountability Monitor, 2006). Improved health 
contributes towards economic growth of a nation at large.  
 
                                                 
13
 These are factors that indirectly that affect efficiency but are not related to revenue expenditure 
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South Africa’s nine provinces have failed to contribute towards an improvement in the 
delivery of healthcare services. Many people in South Africa find it very difficult to 
access proper healthcare services due to lack of properly trained healthcare personnel. In 
2002 and 2005, some provinces that under or over-spent their budget as shown by 
appendix 6. In 2002 and 2005, the Eastern Cape Province under and over-spent its budget 
respectively. This failure by the Eastern Cape to efficiently manage its resources 
contributed to the inefficiency in both the years with CRSTE and VRSTE scores for both 
2002 and 2005 being 0.735 and 0.792 respectively. The VRSTE scores of 0.735 and 
0.792 shows that this inefficiency was largely due to the failure by this department to 
efficiently utilise its resources. The health departments that had efficiency scores equal to 
1.000 were from the Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape for the fiscal years 2002 
and 2005 and the rest were all inefficient (Statssa, 2007).  
Like any other provincial department, the health department lacks adequate personnel to 
provide healthcare services to the sick and those who need medical attention. In 2001, the 
Eastern Cape had 237 healthcare personnel per 1 000 people and in 2005 there was a 
decrease to 230 healthcare personnel per 1 000 people and as compared to the other 
provinces the Eastern Cape is on the third position (Statssa, 2007). This alone 
demonstrates that there is an extremely severe problem in the Eastern Cape Province 
regarding healthcare personnel. This is not good for the health sector which marks the 
linchpin of the economic activity in all provinces, and the nation at large. In this context, 
the ECPG and other provincial governments have a critical challenge to improve on the 
numbers of healthcare personnel. This is immensely necessary in pursuit of the South 
African agenda to improve efficiency in service provision. In tandem with under staffing, 
is under or over-spending of the budget.  
 
The shortage of healthcare personnel in public health facilities force people to resort to 
the use of private hospitals (Statssa, 2007). These private hospitals are only accessed by a 
few people who can afford to pay exorbitant medical fees. In 2003, out of the Eastern 
Cape’s total population of 6 505 000, only 606 000 had medical aid coverage. This means 
that 5 890 000 had no medical aid coverage (Statssa, 2005). This implies that, people 
highly depend on the health services provided by the public healthcare centres and the 
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people who are mostly affected by this shortage of drugs, equipment, nurses and 
especially doctors in the public clinics or hospitals are the poor. For these centres to 
efficiently provide healthcare services, they need support from the provincial 
governments. This support should come in the form of incentives to attract more 
healthcare personnel. Just like the education department, the health sector also has 
inefficiently provided the people with healthcare services. This is evidenced by the lack 
of properly equipped hospitals in the province. In the Eastern Cape, this is due to the 
failure by the ECPG officials to provide public healthcare facilities with adequate budgets 
for them to buy proper hospital or clinic equipment. For example at Frere hospital in East 
London, during the beginning of 2008, many babies died shortly after birth due to 
shortages of staff and lack of equipment, like CTGs and oxygen points (“Why Frere’s 
babies die”, 2008).  
In conclusion, the above results as shown by table 5.2 and figure 5.3 and 5.4 show that all 
the provinces in South Africa with Eastern Cape on the seventh position, need to improve 
the levels of efficiency at which it provide healthcare services to people under their 
jurisdictions. As shown by the Input Oriented VRS DEA results, the health sectors still 
has a long way to go in order to make sure that every South African has access to the 
healthcare services that they provide.  
5.2.5 SOCIAL WELFARE 
 
Table 5-3: Results from the VRS Input - Oriented DEA 
RESULTS FROM DEAP VERSION 2.1 
SOCIAL WELFARE 2002 
   Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.877 1.000 0.877 drs 
 Free Sate 0.684 0.684 1.000 crs 
 Gauteng 0.207 0.207 1.000 crs 
 KwaZulu Natal 0.790 0.879 0.899 drs 
Limpopo 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
 Mpumalanga 0.325 0.325 1.000 crs 
 Northern Cape 0.722 1.000 0.722 drs 
 North West 0.687 0.711 0.966 drs 
 Western Cape 0.227 0.234 0.971 drs 
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Mean 0.613 0.671 0.937   
SOCIAL WELFARE 2005 
   Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.328 1.000 0.328 drs 
 Free Sate 0.081 0.081 1.000 crs 
 Gauteng 0.032 0.032 1.000 crs 
 KwaZulu Natal 0.297 0.655 0.453 drs 
Limpopo 0.334 0.615 0.542 drs 
 Mpumalanga 0.092 0.092 1.000 crs 
 Northern Cape 0.243 0.243 1.000 crs 
 North West 0.266 0.516 0.515 drs 
 Western Cape 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Mean 0.297 0.471 0.760   
Table 5.3 above shows the Input Oriented VRS DEA results for all the provinces, where 
Limpopo and the Western Cape have both CRSTE and VRSTE scores equal to 1.000 in 
2002 and 2005. The Eastern Cape Province has VRSTE scores equal to 1.000 for 2002 
and 2005. This is further supported by figure 5.7 and 5.8 below which shows provinces 
that are inefficient to be below both the CRS and VRS DEA frontiers.  For a full report 
on the results using the VRS input oriented DEA for 2002 and 2005 see Appendix 4.  
Figure 5-5: CRS and VRS DEA Results: Social Welfare 2002 
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Figure 5-6: CRS and VRS DEA Results: Social Welfare 2005 
 
The Input Oriented VRS DEA results reveal that all provinces that have efficiency scores 
below 1.000 are inefficient in the provision of social welfare services to the people in 
their jurisdictions as shown by table 5.3. Likewise, the VRSTE efficiency scores for most 
of the provinces are below 1.000. This means that the inefficiency by these provinces in 
the provision of social welfare services is not only due to over or under expenditure of 
revenue but is due to other factors like problems associated with accessibility of the 
social welfare facilities by most citizens of South Africa, especially those who live in 
rural areas.  
According to the constant return to scale (CRSTE) results for 2002, the Limpopo 
Province is the only province which was efficient because its efficiency score was equal 
to 1.000 it is on the CRS DEA frontier as shown by figure 5.5. All the other provinces 
have efficient scores that are below 1.000 hence they are below the CRS DEA frontier. In 
2005, Western Cape was the only province with an efficient score of 1.000. All the eight 
provinces’ efficient scores were below 1.000; hence they are below the CRS DEA curve. 
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Figure 5.6 above summarizes the 2005 CRSTE results for the social welfare sector for all 
the provinces which shows that provinces that have CRSTE efficient scores below 1.000 
lie below the CRS DEA frontier. Therefore this means that all the other provinces which 
lie below the CRS DEA frontier are not efficient in the provision of social welfare 
services. The CRSTE results show that eight out of nine provinces are inefficient in the 
provision of social welfare services. In 2002, the Eastern Cape was the second most 
efficient province with a score of 0.877 and third most efficient with a score of 0.328. 
The 2005 CRSTE results are very low. This shows that the South African Provinces have 
totally failed to contribute towards the reduction of poverty in the lives of many South 
Africans. 
In 2002, Western and Eastern Cape provinces had VRSTE scores equal to 1.000 and in 
2005 the Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape Province had VRSTE efficiency scores 
equal to 1.000. The VRSTE efficient scores are summarized in figure 5.5 and 5.6 above. 
A VRSTE score of 1.000 means that inefficiency in these provinces is due to over or 
under expenditure of revenue. On the other hand, for those provinces that have VRSTE 
efficiency scores below 1.000 their efficiency is attributed to external14 factors which are 
not related to revenue expenditure.  
Although the Eastern Cape’s VRSTE score is equal to 1.000 for 2002 and 2005, the scale 
efficiency score of 0.877 and 0.328 respectively means that the Eastern Cape cannot be 
conclusively said to be efficient.  These low scale efficiency scores for the Eastern Cape 
and the other provinces show that their inefficiency is due to failure to fully utilise the 
revenue allocated to them by the national government by either over or under-spending. 
The Free State, Gauteng and Mpumalanga under-spent their revenue both in 2002 whilst 
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo, Northern Cape, North West and Western Cape 
provinces over-spent. In 2005 all the nine provinces of South Africa spent more revenue 
than what they were allocated. 
There is a marked deviation of efficiency scores from the best practice frontier with the 
nine provinces having a mean overall efficiency score of 0.615 and 0.768 for 2002 and 
                                                 
14
 These are factors that indirectly that affect efficiency but are not related to revenue expenditure 
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2005 respectively. On average, these provinces are using more or less revenue than 
necessary. This problem can be rectified by reducing or increasing the usage of the 
revenue by 0.307 (30.7 %). In 2005, all the provinces over-spent their revenue hence if 
they had to be efficient they were supposed to reduce their inputs by 0.384 (38.4 %) 
without affecting the level of outputs.  
5.2.6 Social Welfare Budget and Expenditure trends 
 
The social welfare department is focused towards improving social welfare services for 
racial groups that were ignored during the apartheid era. This has been their guiding 
principle since the end of the apartheid era in 1994, and it still is. If truth be told, there 
seem to be no improvement in the lives’ of those who were poor then. As compared to 
other provinces, the Eastern Cape is characterized by high levels of unemployment, 
underdevelopment, poverty, low average household income, poor availability of social 
infrastructure, huge service delivery backlogs and increasing incidences of HIV and 
AIDS (Statssa, 2007). By providing the population of South Africa with social welfare 
services, these provincial governments will be trying to promote the individuals, families 
and the communities’ well being and empowerment by giving them social grants so that 
they will be able to access appropriate social services. These social grants come in the 
form of social security for the aged and the incapacitated, caregivers to children with 
disabilities and those who are 14 years and below, foster care, war veterans and if the 
need arises, food relief. Hence, the Eastern Cape Department of Social Development is 
supposed to deliver services aimed at improving and empowering the poor and the 
vulnerable in the province.  
 
The Provincial governments in South Africa seem to have failed to help a large portion of 
the population that lives in poverty. This is shown by their inability to use the money 
allocated to them properly. In 2002, Free State, Gauteng and Mpumalanga provinces 
under-spent their budget and the rest over-spent their budget. For the fiscal year 2005, all 
the nine provinces over-spent their budgets. In actual fact, this over expenditure did not 
mean that they managed to improve the delivery of social welfare services. This over 
expenditure can be attributed to increased rates of corruption.  
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According to the efficiency results the Eastern Cape Province has a VRSTE score equal 
to 1.000, but the scale efficiency suggest that in reality it is not efficient. In 2002, the 
Eastern Cape under-spent its budget and in 2005 it over-spent its budget. The worrying 
factor is that this over expenditure is probably due to an increase in the number of fraud 
cases in the Eastern Cape in managing social grants. For example, two attorneys from 
Queenstown created fictitious beneficiaries of social grants, and they managed to claim 
R22 million for these ghost beneficiaries (Statssa, 2007). Eastern Cape has the largest 
unemployment rate in South Africa at thirty percent. Only twenty percent of the 
employed have an income between R2 501 and R8 000. And only six percent earn R8 
001 and above. Most of them are not able to sustain themselves on their salaries because 
fifty seven percent earn a salary which is R2 500 or below and at least eleven percent of 
the population does not get any salaries. This means that most of these people depend on 
the social grants from the ECPG (Statssa, 2007). For this reason, the Eastern Cape has the 
largest number of people who receive social grants as compared to other provinces. This 
is also supported by the fact that it tried to increase the number of their pay points in the 
province.  
 
Although the poor population in South Africa receive social grants, the values of these 
social grants are not enough for people to sustain themselves for the whole month 
especially when the prices of basic commodities are increasing almost every day. This 
means that these people will not be able to get education, health or housing services with 
the little money they get from their social welfare departments. The main objective of 
these social grants is to alleviate poverty but this seems not to be the case in the Eastern 
Cape as well as the other provinces. This is so because, most of the South African 
families and communities, in particular those who were disadvantaged by the apartheid 
regime, find it very difficult to get out of the poverty trap. Hence, there is a possibility 
that these people will remain poor throughout their lifespan if these provincial 
departments do not do something to help them. 
 
Since the end of the apartheid era there has not been much improvement in the lives of 
many people in terms of poverty. For example, the R200 monthly child grant is too little 
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for a child’s monthly necessary costs. There is a gross economic discrepancy between 
white and black families in South Africa. For example, sixty-three percent of black 
children live in households with a monthly income of less than R800, while only four 
percent of white children live in households that are this poor. On the other hand, sixty-
four percent of white children live in households with a monthly income of over R6 000 
(Statssa, 2007). These gaps in the social status show that there is need for the ECPG to 
increase social grants and as a matter of fact, under-spending in situations where there is 
shortage of social services is inappropriate. 
 
In conclusion, the above results as shown by table 5.3 and figures 5.5 and 5.6 show that 
all the provinces in South Africa need to improve in the levels of efficiency at which they 
provide social welfare services to the people in their jurisdictions.  As shown by the Input 
oriented VRS results, the social welfare sectors still have a long way to go in order to 
make sure that every South African has access to the social welfare services since this is 
the only way that will help them get out of the poverty trap they are in. Hence, with this 
inefficiency by most of the social welfare departments in South Africa there is a 
possibility that poor South Africans will remain poor throughout their lifespan if there is 
no improvement in the way that they provide these social welfare services. 
5.2.7 HOUSING 
 
Table 5-4: Results from the VRS Input - Oriented DEA 
RESULTS FROM DEAP VERSION 2.1 
HOUSING 2002 
   Province CRSTE VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.126 0.126 1.000 crs 
 Free Sate 0.691 1.000 0.691 drs 
 Gauteng 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
 KwaZulu Natal 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Limpopo 0.177 0.177 1.000 crs 
 Mpumalanga 0.251 0.251 1.000 crs 
 Northern Cape 0.199 1.000 0.199 drs 
 North West 0.380 0.380 1.000 crs 
 Western Cape 0.442 0.442 1.000 crs 
Mean 0.474 0.597 0.877   
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HOUSING 2005 
   Province CRSTE  VRSTE Scale   
Eastern Cape 0.155 0.483 0.322 drs 
 Free Sate 0.149 0.650 0.229 drs 
 Gauteng 0.208 1.000 0.208 drs 
 KwaZulu Natal 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Limpopo 0.027 0.083 0.325 drs 
 Mpumalanga 0.122 0.279 0.437 drs 
 Northern Cape 0.055 1.000 0.055 drs 
 North West 0.072 0.294 0.246 drs 
 Western Cape 0.261 0.657 0.246 drs 
Mean 0.228 0.605 0.358   
 
Table 5.4 shows information on the efficiency of the nine provinces in the provision of 
housing services to the people of South Africa. This is further supported by figure 5.9 and 
5.10 below which shows provinces that are inefficient to be below both the CRS and 
VRS DEA frontiers.  For a full report on the results using the VRS input oriented DEA 
for 2002 and 2005 see Appendix 5.  
Figure 5-7: CRS and VRS DEA Results: Housing 2002 
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Figure 5-8: CRS and VRS DEA Results: Housing 2005 
 
The CRSTE results for 2002, shows that Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal provinces have 
efficiency scores equal to 1.000 and lie on the CRS DEA frontier as shown by figure 5.8. 
In 2005 KwaZulu Natal was the only province that had an efficient score of 1.000 and the 
rest of the provinces where inefficient hence, they lie below the CRS DEA frontier. 
Figure 5.9 above summarizes the 2005 CRSTE results for the housing sector for all the 
provinces in South Africa. Out of the four departments, the housing department has the 
worst results. The Eastern Cape Province has a CRSTE score of 0.126 and 0.155 for 2002 
and 2005 respectively. This shows that it is not efficiently utilizing the revenue that it is 
allocated to provide housing services to the people of the Eastern Cape. And this also 
applies to other provinces with CRSTE scores below 1.000.  
In 2002, provinces like Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and the Free State had VRSTE scores 
equal to 1.000. In 2005, the provinces with VRSTE efficiency scores equal to 1.000 were 
Gauteng, Northern Cape and the North West. This means that other provinces with 
inefficient scores lie under the VRS DEA frontier. The VRSTE efficient scores are 
summarized in figure 5.8 and 5.9 above. The Eastern Cape in 2002 and 2005 had VRSTE 
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scores of 0.126 and 0.483 respectively. This means that inefficiency in the Eastern Cape 
is due to factors that are not attributable to revenue expenditure. Some of these factors 
are: failure by those responsible in the rollout of funds to various projects responsible for 
the provision of housing services to the population. Although most of the South African 
provinces are inefficient, the Eastern Cape is the most inefficient in the provision of 
housing services. This is because; according to the VRSTE results it is on the last 
position.  
The Eastern Cape as compared to other provinces had a scale efficiency score of 1.000 in 
2002 together with seven other provinces. In 2005, KwaZulu Natal was the only province 
that had a scale efficiency scores equal to 1.000. Inefficiency for those provinces with 
scale efficiencies below 1.000 are due to the failure to fully utilise revenue allocated to 
them by the national government by either over or under-spending. Despite the fact that 
there is a critical housing backlog in South Africa, all the nine provinces under-spent the 
budgets both in 2002 and 2005.  
The fact that these provinces under-spent their revenue in 2002 and 2005 means that there 
is a noticeable deviation of efficiency scores from the best practice frontier. The low 
scale efficiency scores suggest that these departments are failing to optimize the revenue 
allocated to them. The mean overall efficiency score of 1.071 and 0.833 2002 and 2005 
respectively means that on average, the nine provinces responsible for the provision of 
social services used less revenue than necessary. The overall efficiency scores 1.071 and 
0.833, shows that these provinces should have improved the usage of their revenue by 
0.535 (53.5%) and 0.416 (41.6%) for them to be fully efficient.  
5.2.8 Housing Budget and Expenditure trends 
 
One of the main roles of the Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs is to see to it that the delivery of housing is done through an efficient stakeholder 
participation, integrated planning and capacity building. The quality of houses in which 
the people live and the access to various services and facilities provide an important 
indication of the well being of household members and of the province at large  (National 
Treasury, 2007). 
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The housing sector in South Africa was and is still characterized by imbalances and 
problems of house ownership and proper accommodation since 1996 when there was a 
critical housing backlog of 2 202 519 million houses (Statssa, 2007). Although the South 
African provincial governments are trying to clear this backlog there is no hope that the 
housing backlogs will be cleared soon. In 2002 and 2005 all the provinces in South 
Africa under-spent revenues that were allocated to them by the national government, see 
appendix 6. In 2005, the Eastern Cape was inefficient with CRSTE and VRSTE scores of 
0.155 and 0.483 respectively. In this particular year the Eastern Cape managed to build 
less houses compared to 2002. All the other provinces with the exception of the Gauteng, 
KwaZulu Natal and the Northern Cape, were inefficient in the provision of housing 
services to the people of South Africa. Eastern Cape and the other provinces under-spent 
their budgets meaning that there has been no improvement in the provision of housing 
services to the people of the Eastern Cape Province and the whole of South Africa. 
 
The efficiency of the South African provinces in the provision of housing services was 
measured by looking at the number of completed houses against the number of informal 
houses in a province. Informal houses include shacks or shanties in formal settlements or 
in backyards. In 2002, in a bid to get rid of a large number of informal settlements the 
Eastern Cape built the largest number of houses. In 2005 it built a smaller number of 
houses as compared to 2002. The efficiency results especially for 2005 show that the 
Eastern Cape Province has been neglecting the housing sector for a very long time. The 
Eastern Cape housing provision is lagging far behind especially in urban areas where 
most people are living in informal houses. For example, in the Amatole area, forty one 
percent of the population lives in informal houses. The same applies to the Nelson 
Mandela Metro area. This means that the ECPG needs to build more houses in order to 
decently accommodate its people. Most of the people who live in these informal houses 
are blacks. Informal dwellings lack piped water and flush toilets. This exposes the 
households to critical health hazards (Statssa, 2007). 
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South Africa has tried to solve the housing problem by building RDP15 houses in order to 
replace the informal houses. Nevertheless, this is not helping much because the RDP 
houses are taking too long to be completed. Such delays are one of the factors that cause 
backlogs in the budget. As a result there are gross inefficiencies in service delivery. A 
case in point is that of the Daliwe Township of the Eastern Cape Province in Amahlathi 
Municipality where the construction of the 100 RDP houses is at a standstill because the 
ECPG is taking its time to approve the construction. This will definitely lead to under-
spending because the construction of these houses should have started in the year that it 
was budgeted for. Because of these delays, the construction will have to be done the 
following year and yet this will not have been budgeted for in that year’s budget. 
 
In conclusion, the above results as shown by table 5.4 and figures 5.8 and 5.9 show that 
the most of the provinces in South Africa, need to improve in their levels of efficiency at 
which it provides housing services to the people under its jurisdictions. The Input 
Oriented VRS DEA results, shows that the provincial governments in South Africa have 
a long way to go in order to make sure that every South African citizen has access to 
proper houses.  The under-spending in 2002 and 2005 was a barrier for those people who 
are in need of proper houses.  
5.3 REASONS FOR OVER AND UNDER EXPENDITURE 
 
The fact that the education, health, social welfare and housing departments in the nine 
provinces of South Africa either under or over-spent the revenue allocated to them means 
that they were not able to provide adequate social services. This is further supported by 
some of the reasons as to why they under or overspent their revenue. Reasons below 
explain why they under-spent their budget: 
a. Misallocation of funds, a case in point, is when the funds meant for 
transfer payments are allocated to other departments. This can also be due 
to late transfers of conditional grants to different departments,  
                                                 
15
 RDP stands for the Reconstruction and Development Programme’s 
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b. Misallocation of the personnel budget. This would occur when the social 
services departments are allocated incorrect personnel budgets in relation 
to the number of staff they have under each department, 
c. The failure by these provinces to timeously spend money on equipment, 
also leads to under-spending of the budget, 
d. Another probable reason is the slow tendering and procurement processes, 
coupled with payment delays due to non–compliance with accounting 
practices by some emerging contractors, 
e. Under staffing, this is supported by the fact that there is a serious shortage 
of critical managerial skills, hence, the under-spending of their budget. 
The failure by these provincial governments to fill in the vacant posts 
contributed significantly towards the  under-spending of the budget 
because staff capacity constraints prevented these provincial departments 
from efficiently providing its people with social services, 
Inorder to improve on efficiency level these provinces are supposed to improve on 
expenditure without increasing the amount of revenue because they often under-spent, 
especially in the housing department. In fact, these provinces should try and address the 
problem of under expenditure.  
 
Over-spending of the budget at face value would look as if the various departments 
responsible for the provision of social services are adequately providing these services to 
the people of South Africa. Nonetheless, this is not the case. This is so because the Input 
Oriented VRS DEA CRSTE and VRSTE mean scores for the years when there was over 
expenditure suggest that they were inefficient in the provision of social services to the 
people in their jurisdictions. The fact that these departments over-spent their revenue 
means that they could not use the scarce resources available to them proficiently. Some 
of the reasons why they over-spent their budget are as follows: 
a. Arrears in salaries from the previous years were paid using the budget of 
the ensuing year, 
b. The payroll system is not updated frequently. To this effect, the over-
spending of the budget could have been a result of the payments of 
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salaries to temporary staff that were not timeously terminated from the 
payroll system. This means that these people were being paid for the work 
that they did not do, 
c. The payment for backlogs from previous years. These payments would be 
made from the budget of the year under review despite the fact they had 
not considered it when planning and budgeting for that year. This would 
definitely lead to over-spending of the budget. An example of payment for 
these backlogs occurred when the Eastern Cape department of education 
had to pay for bursaries in 2004 from their current budget because in 2003 
it had failed to do so using the budget for that year, 
d. Under-budgeting for other activities can lead to over-spending of the 
budget. These provinces seem to under budget for services like electricity 
and catering services. Consequently they end up using more revenue on 
services that they could have budgeted for, but did not, 
e. The other reason is that these provincial departments tend to buy goods in 
the current year but pays for them using the following year’s budget. 
Ironically when budgeting for that following year, it does not include the 
payment of backlogs in that budget. For example, in 2002 the ECPG 
bought a fleet of vehicles but paid for them in 2003. As a result it ended 
up over-spending its budget. 
These reasons show that all these nine provinces in South Africa can improve on their 
efficiency by improving the efficiency with which they spend their revenue. If the ECPG 
as well as the other provinces avoid spending on programs that are not budgeted for, they 
will be able to efficiently provide social services to the people in its jurisdiction. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing discussions in this chapter succinctly demonstrate that the provincial 
departments responsible for the provision of social services to the people of South Africa 
are inefficient. The efficiency scores were analyzed by looking at the CRSTE, VRSTE 
and the scale efficiency scores for the Input Oriented VRS DEA model.  For any province 
to be efficient the CRSTE and VRSTE score was supposed to be equal to 1.000 in both 
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cases, but this was always not the case as shown by the scale efficiency scores. The 
Eastern Cape and some of the provinces have been found to be inefficient because there 
are discrepancies in how they spent their budget. This indicates that there still need to be 
an improvement in how these provinces provide social services because under or over-
spending the budget, this means that they are not making any positive contribution 
towards the lives of the people of South Africa. In fact there has been an increase in the 
rates of poverty incidences with the rural areas being the worst affected.  
 
Lack of employment and low income rates in many households’ means that these 
households are vulnerable to many problems associated with poverty. Such problems are 
lack of healthcare, lack of proper accommodation, and most of all illiteracy amongst the 
children who are from the previously disadvantaged backgrounds. So when these 
provincial governments either under-spent or over-spent their budget it means that the 
poverty problems that have been gripping South Africa will not get solved. It is not just 
spending but it is the value for money and service delivery of outputs that is of primary 
concern in the ECPG and the South African Government as a whole. For the ECPG to be 
efficient in the provision of these social services it needs to first employ the right 
personnel who will be able to administer the funds and implement the various projects 
that will help the ECPG alleviate the poverty problems that the Eastern Cape is facing. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The main focus of this study was to investigate the degree of efficiency in the education, 
health, social welfare and the housing departments of the ECPG vis-à-vis other provinces 
in the provision of social services. This was done in order to see where the Eastern Cape 
Province is positioned when ranking provinces in terms of service provision. Chapter one 
concentrated on the main features of the study, that is, the objectives and the statement of 
the problem. Chapter two gave detailed background information on the nature of the 
social service delivery of South Africa during the pre and post apartheid era. Chapter 
three reviewed the theoretical and the relevant empirical literature. The methodology of 
the study which includes the model specification, data analysis and estimation techniques 
were presented in chapter four. The findings of the study were presented in chapter five. 
This chapter concludes this whole study by briefly analyzing the major findings of the 
study as well as discussing policy recommendations and areas for future research. 
6.2 KEY FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The main idea driving this study has been to address the level of efficiency in the ECPG 
vis-à-vis other provinces in order to deepen the understanding of the magnitude of 
inefficiency and its causes. The study examined the efficiency of four departments 
responsible for the provision of social services in all the nine provinces of South Africa. 
DEA was used to calculate efficiency scores for the various departments in the sample. 
The evidence in this study suggests that these departments were inefficient in the 
provision of social services with the exception of a few provinces. Provincial departments 
that were recognized as being efficient tend to have the same problems of inefficiently 
using the resources or revenue made available to them by the national government. 
 
These results have indicated the existence of a huge potential for improving access and 
quality of social service to the population of the Eastern Cape Province and South Africa 
as a whole without injecting more resources into these four departments. These efficiency 
measurements also helped to identify: efficient departments whose practices can be 
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emulated by the inefficient departments; inefficient departments, whose performance 
needs to be improved, the revenue that is being wasted and the magnitude of waste, and 
the input adjustments needed to make inefficient departments efficient. This kind of 
evidence should help empower the South African provincial government policy makers 
and managers to develop concrete strategies for boosting the efficiency of these four 
departments responsible for the provision of social services. 
 
The central government’s contribution to the social welfare services falls short of what is 
needed to achieve the vision of transforming the provision of social services. This is 
shown by the fact that there are some services that are under funded, like the social 
welfare services. Therefore, the national government is supposed to increase the amount 
of revenue that it contributes towards those provinces like the Eastern Cape because it has 
the largest number of people who are living below the poverty datum line.  Recently there 
has been a significant increase in the number of people in need of social aid grants 
security expenditure, whilst the social welfare assistance and services component of the 
welfare budget has remained static and inadequate. Even though the provision of social 
welfare services is inadequately funded and despite the fact that the Eastern Cape has 
been inefficient in the provision of social welfare services there has not been any 
significant improvement in the life of the people of the Eastern Cape. The Eastern Cape 
has a large number of people living in poverty; therefore, the provision of social aid 
grants is the only efficient way of alleviating poverty among these people. An increase in 
the efficiency at which the social welfare department utilizes their revenue will definitely 
mean that there will be an increase in the number of children going to school, improved 
health status among citizens and improved living standards. 
 
As one of the poorest provinces, the ECPG has been associated with mismanagement of 
funds; if it is not under-spending it is over-spending. The ECPG has significantly under-
spent its budget in all the departments that are responsible for the provision of social 
services, meaning that it has not been able to deliver housing services, improved 
education and health services to the population of the Eastern Cape. This financial 
mismanagement has been attributed to the shortage of personnel with proper 
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administrative and financial management skills. There is also critical need for personnel 
with the initiative to fight poverty in the province. Moreover, this shortage of personnel 
has led to an excessive use of consultants by the ECPG which is very expensive. 
Therefore, the ECPG should have salary packages that are competitive with the private 
sector. Furthermore, for those who are already employed in the public sector, the ECPG 
should make sure that it increases the morale of its staff by increasing their salaries as 
well as the benefits so that they will perform up to the expected standards. Hence, there 
will definitely be an improvement in the efficiency levels at which they provide social 
services to the people of the Eastern Cape. These solutions do not apply to the Eastern 
Cape Province alone but can also be applied to all those provinces that mismanage their 
funds due to the same reasons. 
 
Another contribution to inefficient service delivery in the ECPG and the other provinces 
is fraud, especially in the social welfare department. Fraud and corruption means that 
social grants are not reaching the people that are in real need. As a result of fraud and 
corruption the ECPG has lost a lot of money which could have been used in the 
improvement of lives in the Eastern Cape Province. There has been an increase in the 
number of cases where the social welfare department corrupt personnel has created 
fictitious people that are in need of the social grants and at most times these applications 
are approved. Therefore, every province should set up a database with information on all 
the people who have applied for the social grants so that they will be able to make a 
follow up on these individuals and see whether they really exist and investigate if they 
are really in need of the grant.  
 
On the other hand, the ECPG is also losing funds by paying salaries to personnel that are 
no longer on their payroll and most of them are ex-temporary staff whose contracts have 
been terminated a long time back but are still on the payroll database. Therefore, the 
ECPG and all the other provinces should put up a system in place where as soon as a 
person retires, resigns or dies, all the salaries or payments to that person should be 
automatically stopped.  
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The payment of backlogs is eroding the ability of the provincial governments in South 
Africa to provide essential social services to the people. For this reason, the ECPG should 
ensure that it settles its debts in time in order to avoid the accumulation of backlogs. If it 
happens to have these backlogs, the ECPG should make sure that it makes provision for 
them in the budget for the following year. There have been situations whereby the ECPG 
has failed to transfer funds to the various departments that are responsible for the 
provision of social services timeously. Therefore, the provincial governments should 
make sure that funds are deployed to the various departments in time so that if the 
departments fail to use these funds they should get an explanation from those 
departments as to why they have mismanaged their funds.  
 
Moreover, the ECPG and all the other provinces should make sure that there has been an 
improvement in the speed at which tendering and procurement processes are done. And 
in the process, make sure that these companies that are awarded tendering licences 
comply with the accounting practices so that there would not be any delays in the 
payments. In cases where the backlogs are periodic in nature, for example, the need to 
‘adjust staff salaries when higher qualifications are gained’, should be included in the 
budget when doing the planning and budgeting processes for the subsequent fiscal year 
so that when the situation arises, they will know that they do have the revenue set aside 
for these salary increments. 
 
Referring to the above information as well as DEA results discussed in chapter 5, it is 
clear that the ECPG as well as the other provinces have proved beyond reasonable doubt 
that they are inefficient in the provision of social services. Therefore, the South African 
national government should make sure that the private sector plays a significant role in 
the provision and the delivery of services especially in education, healthcare, housing and 
social welfare.  
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study was mainly confined to the ECPG’s and other provincial government’s four 
departments responsible for the provision of social services without considering the other 
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departments. There is a need to investigate the efficiency of the other departments left out 
in this research.  
 
To increase the relevance of the study for management purposes, it would have been 
useful to undertake a second stage analysis of the factors influencing inefficiency using a 
Tobit–censored dependant variable model-regression analysis. The absence of data on the 
factors hypothesized to influence inefficiency made it impossible to undertake the second 
stage analysis.  
 
The results have clearly indicated that the ECPG departments as well as all departments 
of other provinces responsible for the provision of social services are inefficient in the 
provision of social services. Hence, one wonders what will happen if these provincial 
governments hand over all the budget and planning decisions to the local government. 
The big question will be "will the local government be able to efficiently provide social 
services to the people of South Africa, and in the process reduce the huge poverty gaps 
that are there among the previously disadvantaged and advantaged groups during the 
apartheid era”? In fact, the research question will be" will a two tier system be feasible in 
South Africa"? 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
 
The DEA efficiency results from chapter 5 conclude that the ECPG and most provinces 
are inefficient in the provision of social services, although, some of the results indicate 
efficiency levels. Therefore, it is a reality that the ECPG has failed to efficiently provide 
social services meaning that there has been a reduction in the total marginal social benefit 
of the province as a whole. This inefficiency by the Eastern Cape Provincial Government 
to monitor and manage service provision means that it has failed to act according to the 
Public Financial Management Act No 1 of 1999 which states that it is the duty of the 
Provincial Government to ensure that revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities are 
managed efficiently (National treasury, 2006). In this case the ECPG was supposed to 
make sure that it has efficiently utilized the scarce resources allocated to it to promote the 
quality of life of its citizens, thereby reducing poverty levels.  
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From the evidence in chapter 5 the ECPG over-spent as well as under-spent its budget. 
As a result of under-spending, the Eastern Cape Provincial Government deprived the 
population of the Eastern Cape of their right to social services. The fact the Eastern Cape 
attributes this under-spending to shortage of staff means that as long as it does not 
employ the right qualified personnel to fill in the vacant posts, it will not be in a position 
to efficiently provide social services to the people in its jurisdiction. 
 
Over-spending due to the payment of backlogs among other reasons indicates that the 
Eastern Cape Department is not planning and budgeting appropriately to ensure an 
efficient use of the resources that are available to them. This has negative effects on the 
financial position of the Eastern Cape Provincial Government because it will have to 
compromise its ability to deliver adequate levels of service in the medium term.  This is 
so because backlogs from the previous financial period will have to be financed by the 
current year’s budget. If this process is left unchecked it will gradually weaken the 
Provincial’s Government ability to deliver on its predetermined goals. As a result the 
ECPG and all the other provinces will continue to be inefficient in the provision of social 
services. 
 
The provincial governments in South Africa are very much aware of the importance of 
improving the delivery of social services to the people as well as improving the 
infrastructure. But today there is an increasing number of protests all over South Africa 
and the Eastern Cape Province seems to have the largest number of people who are 
protesting about the poor service delivery in the education, health, housing and social 
welfare services. Although there has been an increase in the social aid through grants 
targeting the poor, especially those that were previously disadvantaged, there has not 
been much improvement in the lives of many South Africans living in the Eastern Cape 
Province.  
 
From the above discussion the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, to a large extent, 
seems to have failed to provide the essential services in question to the people in its 
jurisdiction. Due to these problems of inefficiency in the ECPG, President Thabo Mbeki 
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ordered the Interim Management Team (IMT) to take curatorship of the four major 
service delivery departments in the Province (Public Sector Accountability Monitor, 
2005). This Interim Management Team is to assist the Province in improving the delivery 
of essential services through the development and implementation of appropriate 
turnaround strategies within these four key departments. The intervention of the Interim 
Management Team suggests that inefficiencies in the delivery of services are mainly 
attributable to poor management. 
 
 The fact that the four departments of the Eastern Cape Provincial Government have 
proved that they cannot efficiently deliver services, means that they are seriously 
obstructing the progressive realization of the public’s right of access to healthcare, 
education, and social welfare as well as housing services. These are articulated in the 
1996 Constitution. This inefficiency can also be attributed to the failure by the Eastern 
Cape Province to come up with a system that can adequately monitor all the expenses 
accurately. Hence they end up under or over-spending the budget. The explanation that 
monies can be misallocated under different line items leads to inefficiencies in the 
delivery of social services. 
 
The Department’s failure to spend public funds translates into the denial of services to the 
population of the Eastern Cape. This mismanagement of funds is against the doctrine of 
the South African National Government of trying to eradicate poverty and extending 
basic services to areas that were previously excluded under the apartheid regime. 
Therefore, the ECPG is supposed to monitor and provide support to the local government 
so that there will be improvement in the efficiency of service delivery to the people in the 
Eastern Cape Province.  
 
In a nutshell, the poor service delivery as evidenced in the above research seems to be 
due to the incompetence of the ECPG and also those departments that are also inefficient.  
Moreover, it shows that fiscal decentralisation as a service delivery vehicle is not 
working for the Eastern Cape Province as well as the other provinces. Therefore, this 
research has clearly shown us that DEA does not only help policymakers answer the 
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question “How well are the departments responsible for the provision of social services 
performing?” but also “How their performance could be improved?” 
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7 APPENDIX 
 
Table 7-1: Data for the nine provinces in the provision of social services 
EDUCATION DATA 
Province YEAR Revenue (%) 
Expenditur
e (%) 
Matric Pass 
Rate 
Learner: Educator  
Ratio 
Eastern Cape 2002 1.000 0.961 0.518 0.330 
Free State 2002 1.000 0.942 0.707 0.300 
Gauteng 2002 1.000 0.839 0.781 0.317 
KwaZulu-Natal 2002 1.000 0.893 0.701 0.344 
Limpopo 2002 1.000 0.979 0.695 0.341 
Mpumalanga 2002 1.000 0.985 0.558 0.336 
Northern Cape 2002 1.000 0.836 0.899 0.319 
North West 2002 1.000 0.934 0.678 0.311 
Western Cape 2002 1.000 0.816 0.865 0.315 
Eastern Cape 2005 1.000 0.866 0.567 0.190 
Free State 2005 1.000 0.874 0.778 0.210 
Gauteng 2005 1.000 0.743 0.749 0.170 
KwaZulu-Natal 2005 1.000 0.824 0.705 0.170 
Limpopo 2005 1.000 0.901 0.647 0.210 
Mpumalanga 2005 1.000 0.955 0.586 0.390 
Northern Cape 2005 1.000 0.808 0.789 0.180 
North West 2005 1.000 0.848 0.630 0.170 
Western Cape 2005 1.000 0.740 0.844 0.150 
HEALTH DATA 
Province YEAR Revenue (%) 
Expenditur
e (%) 
Healthcare personnel per 1000 
population 
Eastern Cape 2002 1.000 0.990 0.238 
Free State 2002 1.000 1.188 0.203 
Gauteng 2002 1.000 1.706 0.196 
KwaZulu-Natal 2002 1.000 1.480 0.190 
Limpopo 2002 1.000 0.866 0.235 
Mpumalanga 2002 1.000 0.878 0.281 
Northern Cape 2002 1.000 0.918 0.212 
North West 2002 1.000 0.898 0.240 
Western Cape 2002 1.000 1.496 0.175 
Eastern Cape 2005 1.000 1.005 0.231 
Free State 2005 1.000 1.156 0.201 
Gauteng 2005 1.000 1.494 0.220 
KwaZulu-Natal 2005 1.000 1.217 0.183 
Limpopo 2005 1.000 0.853 0.216 
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Mpumalanga 2005 1.000 0.960 0.242 
Northern Cape 2005 1.000 0.997 0.199 
North West 2005 1.000 0.970 0.232 
Western Cape 2005 1.000 1.361 0.198 
SOCIAL WELFARE DATA 
Province YEAR Revenue (%) 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Pple who receive 
SGs (%) 
No of 
paypoints 
Eastern Cape 2002 1.000 1.359 1.359 0.436 
Free State 2002 1.000 1.177 1.177 0.497 
Gauteng 2002 1.000 0.930 0.930 1.641 
KwaZulu-Natal 2002 1.000 1.326 1.326 0.472 
Limpopo 2002 1.000 1.209 1.209 0.340 
Mpumalanga 2002 1.000 1.169 1.169 1.046 
Northern Cape 2002 1.000 1.489 1.489 0.580 
North West 2002 1.000 1.243 1.243 0.509 
Western Cape 2002 1.000 1.238 1.238 1.532 
Eastern Cape 2005 1.000 1.643 1.643 0.801 
Free State 2005 1.000 1.372 1.372 2.765 
Gauteng 2005 1.000 1.168 1.168 7.005 
KwaZulu-Natal 2005 1.000 1.537 1.537 0.829 
Limpopo 2005 1.000 1.495 1.495 0.717 
Mpumalanga 2005 1.000 1.317 1.317 2.433 
Northern Cape 2005 1.000 1.340 1.340 0.927 
North West 2005 1.000 1.506 1.506 0.907 
Western Cape 2005 1.000 1.406 1.406 0.225 
HOUSING DATA 
Province YEAR Revenue (%) 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Informal 
hsehlds (%) 
Completed 
Hses (%) 
Eastern Cape 2002 1.000 0.208 0.023 0.453 
Free State 2002 1.000 0.271 0.044 0.085 
Gauteng 2002 1.000 0.263 0.054 0.057 
KwaZulu-Natal 2002 1.000 0.195 0.268 0.078 
Limpopo 2002 1.000 0.232 0.012 0.322 
Mpumalanga 2002 1.000 0.168 0.035 0.227 
Northern Cape 2002 1.000 0.279 0.019 0.304 
North West 2002 1.000 0.253 0.034 0.150 
Western Cape 2002 1.000 0.188 0.040 0.129 
Eastern Cape 2005 1.000 0.199 0.018 0.122 
Free State 2005 1.000 0.252 0.036 0.161 
Gauteng 2005 1.000 0.279 0.048 0.128 
KwaZulu-Natal 2005 1.000 0.147 0.033 0.014 
Limpopo 2005 1.000 0.198 0.008 0.696 
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Mpumalanga 2005 1.000 0.175 0.030 0.137 
Northern Cape 2005 1.000 0.303 0.022 0.525 
North West 2005 1.000 0.213 0.042 0.280 
Western Cape 2005 1.000 0.181 0.034 0.066 
(National Treasury, 2007) 
7.1 APPENDIX 2 
Results from DEAP Version 2.1 for the Education, Health, Social Welfare and the 
Housing Department 
 
Input orientated DEA 
 Scale assumption: VRS 
 Slacks calculated using multi-stage method 
 
 Instruction file = Ed2-ins.txt  
Data file          = ed2-dta.txt  
 FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS16: 
 Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 0.957 
Scale efficiency     = 0.969 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
 Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
output     2 0.961 0.000 0.000 0.961 
output     3 0.518 0.000 0.123 0.641 
input      1 0.330 -0.014 0.000 0.316 
     
 
Results for Firm: 2 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.942 
 output     3 0.707 0.000 0.000 0.707 
 input      1 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.300 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Firm 1 is the Eastern Cape, 2 Free Sate, 3 Gauteng, 4 KwaZulu Natal, 5 Limpopo, 6 Mpumalanga, 7 
Northern Cape, 8 North West and 9 is Western Cape. 
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Results for Firm: 3 
Technical efficiency = 0.969 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
output     2 0.839 0.000 0.044 0.883 
output     3 0.781 0.000 0.000 0.781 
input      1 0.317 -0.010 0.000 0.307 
   
Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 0.872 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
output     2 0.893 0.000 0.049 0.942 
output     3 0.701 0.000 0.006 0.707 
input      1 0.344 -0.044 0.000 0.300 
  
Results for Firm:     5 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.914 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
output     2 0.979 0.000 0.000 0.979 
output     3 0.695 0.000 0.000 0.695 
input      1 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.341 
  
Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.934 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output  1     1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Output 2 0.985 0.000 0.000 0.985 
 Output 3 0.558 0.000 0.000 0.558 
 input   1  0.336 0.000 0.000 0.336 
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Results for Firm:  7 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
output     2 0.836 0.000 0.000 0.836 
output     3 0.899 0.000 0.000 0.899 
input      1 0.319 0.000 0.000 0.319 
 
Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 0.965 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
 Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement      movement value 
 output  1     1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Output 2 0.934 0.000 0.008 0.942 
 Output 3 0.678 0.000 0.029 0.707 
 input      1 0.311 -0.011 0.000 0.300 
  
Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output  1     1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Output 2 0.816 0.000 0.000 0.816 
 Output 3 0.865 0.000 0.000 0.865 
 input     1 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.315 
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Instruction file = Ed5-ins.txt  
Data file          = ed5-dta.txt  
 FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS: 
 Results for Firm:  1 
Technical efficiency = 0.966 
Scale efficiency     = 0.946 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.866 0.000 0.000 0.866 
 output     3 0.567 0.000 0.069 0.636 
 input      1 0.190 -0.006 0.000 0.184 
 
Results for Firm:  2 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.838 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.874 0.000 0.000 0.874 
 output     3 0.778 0.000 0.000 0.778 
 input      1 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.210 
 
Results for Firm: 3 
Technical efficiency = 0.886 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.743 0.000 0.000 0.743 
 output     3 0.749 0.000 0.089 0.838 
 input      1 0.170 -0.019 0.000 0.151 
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Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.975 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output   1   1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
output  2    0.824 0.000 0.000 0.824 
 output  3   0.705 0.000 0.000 0.705 
 input      1 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.170 
  
 Results for Firm:  5 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.860 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.901 0.000 0.000 0.901 
 output     3 0.647 0.000 0.000 0.647 
 input      1 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.210 
 
 Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.491 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.955 0.000 0.000 0.955 
 output     3 0.586 0.000 0.000 0.586 
 input      1 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.390 
   
Results for Firm: 7 
Technical efficiency = 0.981 
Scale efficiency     = 0.923 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.808 0.000 0.000 0.808 
 output     3 0.789 0.000 0.000 0.789 
 input      1 0.180 -0.003 0.000 0.177 
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 Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.848 0.000 0.000 0.848 
 output     3 0.630 0.000 0.000 0.630 
 input      1 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.170 
 
Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.740 0.000 0.000 0.740 
 output     3 0.844 0.000 0.000 0.844 
 input      1 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.150 
 
7.2 APPENDIX 3 
 
Instruction file = he2-ins.txt  
Data file          = he2-dta.txt  
 FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS: 
 Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 0.735 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.990 0.000 0.506 1.496 
 input      1 0.238 -0.063 0.000 0.175 
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Results for Firm:  2 
Technical efficiency = 0.862 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.188 0.000 0.308 1.496 
 input      1 0.203 -0.028 0.000 0.175 
 
 
Results for Firm:  3 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.706 0.000 0.000 1.706 
 input      1 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.196 
 
 
 Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 0.921 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.480 0.000 0.016 1.496 
 input      1 0.190 -0.015 0.000 0.175 
 
Results for Firm: 5 
Technical efficiency = 0.745 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.866 0.000  0.630 1.496 
 input      1 0.235 -0.060 0.000 
 
0.175 
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Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 0.623 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.878 0.000 0.618 1.496 
 input      1 0.281 -0.106 0.000 0.175 
  
Results for Firm: 7 
Technical efficiency = 0.825 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.918 0.000 0.578 1.496 
 input      1 0.212 -0.037 0.000 0.175 
  
Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 0.729 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.898 0.000 0.598 1.496 
 input      1 0.240 -0.065 0.000 0.175 
 
Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.496 0.000 0.000 1.496 
 input      1 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.175 
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Instruction file = he5-ins.txt  
Data file          = he5-dta.txt  
FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS: 
 Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 0.792 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.005 0.000 0.212 1.217 
 input      1 0.231 -0.048 0.000 0.183 
 
 Results for Firm:  2 
Technical efficiency = 0.910 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement 
 
movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.156 0.000 0.061 1.217 
 input      1 0.201 -0.018 0.000 0.183 
   
Results for Firm: 3 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.988 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.494 0.000 0.000 1.494 
 input      1 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.220 
  
Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.217 0.000 0.000 1.217 
 input      1 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.183 
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Results for Firm: 5 
Technical efficiency = 0.847 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.853 0.000 0.364 1.217 
 input      1 0.216 -0.033 0.000 0.183 
     
  
Results for Firm:  6 
Technical efficiency = 0.756 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.960 0.000 0.257 1.217 
 input      1 0.242 -0.059 0.000 0.183 
  
Results for Firm: 7 
Technical efficiency = 0.920 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.997 0.000 0.220 1.217 
 input      1 0.199 -0.016 0.000 0.183 
   
Results for Firm:  8 
Technical efficiency = 0.789 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.970 0.000 0.247 1.217 
 input      1 0.232 -0.049 0.000 0.183 
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Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.361 0.000 0.000 1.361 
 input      1 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.198 
  
7.3 APPENDIX 4 
 
Instruction file = sw2-ins.txt  
Data file          = sw2-dta.txt  
FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS: 
  Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.877 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.359 0.000 0.000 1.359 
 output     3 1.359 0.000 0.000 1.359 
 input      1 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.436 
  
 Results for Firm: 2 
Technical efficiency = 0.684 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.177 0.000 0.032 1.209 
 output     3 1.177 0.000 0.032 1.209 
 input      1 0.497 -0.157 0.000 0.340 
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Results for Firm: 3 
Technical efficiency = 0.207 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output  1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output  2 0.930 0.000 0.279 1.209 
 output  3 0.930 0.000 0.279 1.209 
 input   1 1.641 -1.301 0.000 0.340 
   
Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 0.879 
Scale efficiency     = 0.899 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.326 0.000 0.000 1.326 
 output     3 1.326 0.000 0.000 1.326 
 input      1 0.472 -0.057 0.000 0.415 
  
 Results for Firm: 5 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.209 0.000 0.000 1.209 
 output     3 1.209 0.000 0.000 1.209 
 input      1 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.340 
   
Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 0.325 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.169 0.000 0.040 1.209 
 output     3 1.169 0.000 0.040 1.209 
 input      1 1.046 -0.706 0.000 0.340 
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Results for Firm: 7 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.722 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.489 0.000 0.000 1.489 
 output     3 1.489 0.000 0.000 1.489 
 input      1 0.580 0.000 0.000 0.580 
  
 Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 0.711 
Scale efficiency     = 0.966 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.243 0.000 0.000 1.243 
 output     3 1.243 0.000 0.000 1.243 
 input      1 0.509 -0.147 0.000 0.362 
     
 
 Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 0.234 
Scale efficiency     = 0.971 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.238 0.000 0.000 1.238 
 output     3 1.238 0.000 0.000 1.238 
 input      1 1.532 -1.173 0.000 0.359 
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Instruction file = sw5-ins.txt  
Data file          = sw5-dta.txt  
  FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS: 
 Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.328 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement               value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.643 0.000 0.000 1.643 
 output     3 1.643 0.000 0.000 1.643 
 input      1 0.801 0.000 0.000 0.801 
 
 Results for Firm: 2 
Technical efficiency = 0.081 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.372 0.000 0.034 1.406 
 output     3 1.372 0.000 0.034 1.406 
 input      1 2.765 -2.540 0.000 0.225 
   
Results for Firm: 3 
Technical efficiency = 0.032 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.168 0.000 0.238 1.406 
 output     3 1.168 0.000 0.238 1.406 
 input      1 7.005 -6.780 0.000 0.225 
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Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 0.655 
Scale efficiency     = 0.453 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.537 0.000 0.000 1.537 
 output     3 1.537 0.000 0.000 1.537 
 input      1 0.829 -0.286 0.000 0.543 
  
 Results for Firm: 5 
Technical efficiency = 0.615 
Scale efficiency     = 0.542 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.495 0.000 0.000 1.495 
 output     3 1.495 0.000 0.000 1.495 
 input      1 0.717 -0.276 0.000 0.441 
 
Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 0.092 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.317 0.000 0.089 1.406 
 output     3 1.317 0.000 0.089 1.406 
 input      1 2.433 -2.208 0.000 0.225 
 
Results for Firm: 7 
Technical efficiency = 0.243 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement         value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.340 0.000 0.066 1.406 
 output     3 1.340 0.000 0.066 1.406 
 input      1 0.927 -0.702 0.000 0.225 
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 Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 0.516 
Scale efficiency     = 0.515 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.506 0.000 0.000 1.506 
 output     3 1.506 0.000 0.000 1.506 
 input      1 0.907 -0.439 0.000                        0.468 
 
 Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 1.406 0.000 0.000 1.406 
 output     3 1.406 0.000 0.000 1.406 
 input      1 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.225 
 
7.4 APPENDIX 5 
 
Instruction file = hs2-ins.txt  
Data file          = hs2-dta.txt  
FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS 
Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 0.126 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.208 0.000 0.055 0.263 
 output     3 0.023 0.000 0.031 0.054 
 input      1 0.453 -0.396 0.000 0.057 
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Results for Firm: 2 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.691 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement      movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.271 
 output     3 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.044 
 input      1 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.085 
 
 Results for Firm: 3 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.263 
 output     3 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.054 
 input      1 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.057 
  
Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.195 
 output     3 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.268 
 input      1 0.078 0.000 0.000               0.078 
 
 Results for Firm: 5 
Technical efficiency = 0.177 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.232 0.000 0.031 0.263 
 output     3 0.012 0.000 0.042 0.054 
 input      1 0.322 -0.265 0.000 0.057 
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 Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 0.251 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output   1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output   2 0.168 0.000 0.095 0.263 
 output   3 0.035 0.000 0.019 0.054 
 input     1 0.227 -0.170 0.000                0.057 
     
  
 Results for Firm:     7 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.199 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.279 
 output     3 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.019 
 input      1 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.304 
 
  Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 0.380 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.253 0.000 0.010 0.263 
 output     3 0.034 0.000 0.020 0.054 
 input      1 0.150 -0.093 0.000 0.057 
 
 Results for Firm: 9 
Technical efficiency = 0.442 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.188 0.000 0.075 0.263 
 output     3 0.040 0.000 0.014 0.054 
 input      1 0.129 -0.072 0.000                        0.057 
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Instruction file = hs5-ins.txt  
Data file          = hs5-dta.txt  
FIRM BY FIRM RESULTS 
Results for Firm: 1 
Technical efficiency = 0.483 
Scale efficiency     = 0.322 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.199 
 output     3 0.018 0.000 0.021 0.039 
 input      1 0.122 -0.063 0.000 0.059 
 
Results for Firm:  2 
Technical efficiency = 0.650 
Scale efficiency     = 0.229 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.252 
 output     3 0.036 0.000 0.009 0.045 
 input      1 0.161 -0.056 0.000 0.105 
 
Results for Firm:  3 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.208 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.279 
 output     3 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.048 
 input      1 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.128 
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 Results for Firm: 4 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 1.000 (crs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.147 
 output     3 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.033 
 input      1 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.014 
  
 Results for Firm: 5 
Technical efficiency = 0.083 
Scale efficiency     = 0.325 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.198 
 output     3 0.008 0.000 0.031 0.039 
 input      1 0.696 -0.638 0.000 0.058 
 
 Results for Firm: 6 
Technical efficiency = 0.279 
Scale efficiency     = 0.437 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.175 
 output     3 0.030 0.000 0.006 0.036 
 input      1 0.137 -0.099 0.000 0.038 
   
Results for Firm: 7 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency     = 0.055 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.303 
 output     3 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.022 
 input      1 0.525 0.000 0.000 0.525 
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 Results for Firm: 8 
Technical efficiency = 0.294 
Scale efficiency     = 0.246 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.213 0.000 0.013 0.226 
 output     3 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.042 
 input      1 0.280 -0.198 0.000 0.082 
  
 Results for Firm:  9 
Technical efficiency = 0.657 
Scale efficiency     = 0.398 (drs) 
 PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
  Variable original radial slack projected 
 value movement movement value 
 output     1 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 output     2 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.181 
 output     3 0.034 0.000 0.003 0.037 
 input      1 0.066 -0.023 0.000 0.043 
 
 
Note: crste = technical efficiency from CRS DEA 
      Vrste = technical efficiency from VRS DEA 
      Scale = scale efficiency = crste/vrste 
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7.5 APPENDIX 6 
 
Table 7-2: Budget, Revenue and Deficit for 2002 and 2005 
Provin
ce Revenue Expenditure 
Deficit 
2002 
Provi
nce Revenue Expenditure 
Deficit 
2005 
EC17 9650170 9278000 372170 EC 13556240 11741000 1815240 
EC 3933000 3892000 41000 EC 6282160 6314000 -31840 
EC 3726000 4663000 -937000 EC 5951520 9779000 -3827480 
EC 4001290 832881 3168409 EC 5620880 1116994 4503886 
FS18 3958140 3636000 322140 FS 5478830 4791000 687830 
FS 1644640 1954000 -309360 FS 2538970 2935000 -396030 
FS 1558080 1483000 75080 FS 2405340 3299000 -893660 
FS 1641180 444325 1196855 FS 2271710 571795 1699915 
G19 9768250 8193000 1575250 G 13174120 9793000 3381120 
G 4008620 6838000 -2829380 G 6105080 9121000 -3015920 
G 3797640 3018000 779640 G 5783760 6754000 -970240 
G 4050250 1064942 2985308 G 5462440 1526405 3936035 
KZN20 11618170 10373000 1245170 KZN 16321280 13451000 2870280 
KZN 4749620 7030000 -2280380 KZN 7563520 9208000 -1644480 
KZN 4499640 5049000 -549360 KZN 7165440 11014000 -3848560 
KZN 4817290 940843 3876447 KZN 6767360 991546 5775814 
L21 7546050 7385000 161050 L 10545610 9498000 1047610 
L 3075910 2664000 411910 L 4886990 4167000 719990 
L 2914020 2969000 -54980 L 4629780 6923000 -2293220 
L 3128850 724778 2404072 L 4372570 865621 3506949 
M22 4009390 3951000 58390 M 5627250 5374000 253250 
M 1658700 1457000 201700 M 2607750 2503000 104750 
M 1571400 1527000 44400 M 2470500 3254000 -783500 
M 1662430 278633 1383797 M 2333250 408917 1924333 
NC23 1376370 1151000 225370 NC 1926590 1556000 370590 
NC 563350 517000 46350 NC 892810 890000 2810 
NC 533700 698000 -164300 NC 845820 1133000 -287180 
NC 570690 159363 411327 NC 798830 241854 556976 
NW24 4637100 4332000 305100 NW 6588290 5585000 1003290 
                                                 
17
 EC means Eastern Cape,  
18
 FS means Free State 
19
 G means Gauteng  
20
 KZN means KwaZulu Natal  
21
 L means Limpopo 
22
 M stands for Mpumalanga 
23
 NC means Northern Cape 
24
 NW means North West 
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NW 1892970 1699000 193970 NW 3053110 2963000 90110 
NW 1793340 2042000 -248660 NW 2892420 4356000 -1463580 
NW 1922700 486922 1435778 NW 2731730 582251 2149479 
WC25 5885550 4803000 1082550 WC 7673560 5676000 1997560 
WC 2477790 3706000 -1228210 WC 3556040 4841000 -1284960 
WC 2347380 2389000 -41620 WC 3368880 4737000 -1368120 
WC 2440350 458822 1981528 WC 3181720 575864 2605856 
 
(National Treasury, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 WC means Western Cape 
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7.6  APPENDIX 7 
 
Figure 7-1: The relationship between revenue and expenditure: 2002 
 
149 
 
7.7 APPENDIX 8 
Figure 7-2: The relationship between revenue and expenditure: 2005 
 
